"No Human Being is Illegal": Comparing Framing Strategies in the Immigrant Rights Movement by Freitas, Savannah
Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:108813
This work is posted on eScholarship@BC,
Boston College University Libraries.
Boston College Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, 2020
Copyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted.
"No Human Being is Illegal": Comparing
Framing Strategies in the Immigrant
Rights Movement
Author: Savannah Freitas
  
 
 
 
 
 
“NO HUMAN BEING IS ILLEGAL”:  
COMPARING FRAMING STRATEGIES IN THE IMMIGRANT RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
 
by 
Savannah Freitas 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment  
of graduation requirements for the degree of 
Bachelor of Arts 
 
Boston College 
International Studies Program 
May 2020 
 
Advisor: Prof. William Attwood-Charles  
 
 
IS Program Director: Prof. Erik Owens 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Savannah Freitas 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Immigration policy has undoubtedly taken a forefront spot in the national dialogue in our 
contemporary political moment. However, there is considerable disagreement among and 
within political parties about how to address this issue. This paper seeks to better 
understand the priorities of immigrant rights activists in the U.S. by executing case 
studies on 11 immigrant rights organizations. I explore which framing strategies each 
group uses to push for its goals and theorize about how these social movement 
organizations (SMOs) arrive at the strategic frames that they do. Through discourse 
analysis and coding of interviews, websites, and other media sources, I conclude that the 
most relevant factors in determining what frame a group arrives at are its external 
resource environment and how professionalized the organization is. There is additional 
evidence to suggest that the political opportunity structure, salience of a previously 
successful ‘master frame,’ and the age of leaders also affect framing processes. Finally, 
my data does not suggest that being immigrant-led versus led by non-immigrant ‘allies’ 
directly affects an SMOs’ framing strategies, but it does affect the external resource 
environment from which it is able to draw.  
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Introduction: Why Talk about Framing? 
 On September 5th, 2017, the Trump administration rescinded the Deferred Action 
for Childhood Arrivals program (DACA) created under the Obama administration. 
Protests erupted across the country in locations such as college campuses, busy areas of 
major cities, and in front of buildings including Trump Tower. The volume and 
magnitude of these protests and those that followed for the next six months or more 
exceeded any high-profile public demonstrations regarding immigration policies under 
the Obama administration. Why did this particular policy decision spark the intensity of 
resistance that it did? How it was able to gain such widespread support? Did the framing 
strategies used by activists to attract widespread support compromise their fight for other 
movement goals, such as permanent protection for all immigrants?  
These questions are crucial to better understanding of the current state of the 
immigrant rights movement. This paper will explore how eleven different immigrant 
rights organizations in the Northeast United States employ framing strategies and 
speculate about why they choose the frames that they do. Through a case study approach, 
I analyze discourse produced by each organization along with interviews with leaders to 
arrive at conclusions about how each organization frames the ‘issue’ of immigration and 
what factors might impact these choices. The results of my analysis are key to 
understanding the contemporary challenges and conflicts that the movement faces, as 
well as to predict where the movement is heading in the years to come. To begin, I will 
describe the response to the Trump administration’s decision to rescind DACA in 2017 to 
illustrate the how movements use framing to push for their goals. This political moment 
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highlights the importance of examining frames, understanding their limitations, and 
considering how choosing frames can cause tension between achieving a movement’s 
numerous goals.   
 DACA was created in 2012 under Barack Obama’s presidency. The program 
protects individuals who came to the United States before the age of sixteen from being 
deported and provides them with a work permit. It was expanded in 2014 to lengthen the 
work authorization and deferred action periods and to include a wider range of eligible 
ages (Duke, 2017). The 2014 memorandum also established “Deferred Action for Parents 
of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents” (DAPA) whereby parents of citizens or 
permanent residents would undergo a similar deferred action period, but the Supreme 
Court ruled against the program in the summer of 2016 (Duke, 2017). The memorandum 
that formally rescinded DACA was released on September 5th, 2017. President Trump 
gave Congress a 6-month deadline to “legalize DACA” (according to a tweet), setting up 
a rush for lawmakers to find an alternative (Pramuk, 2017).  
 Opposition to the Trump administration’s decision was seen across both parties 
and among a wide constituency of people. Powerful Republican lawmakers including 
then House speaker Paul Ryan urged President Trump not to rescind DACA (Acosta & 
Kopan, 2017). Various news articles published in the aftermath stressed the damage to 
the economy that the rescission could bring. According to CNBC, an early 2017 study 
estimated that U.S. GDP would be reduced by $433 billion over the next 10 years without 
the economic contributions of DREAMers (Pramuk, 2017). During the week of the 
announcement, more than 400 business leaders signed a letter addressed to Donald 
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Trump and congressional leaders stressing that DREAMers are vital to the economy 
(Wichter, 2017). Executives and founders of Apple, Facebook, Microsoft, Google, 
Disney and many more corporate figures publically expressed their disapproval of the 
decision. President Barack Obama also alluded to the economic contributions of 
DREAMers in a statement: “To target these young people is wrong—because they have 
done nothing wrong. It is self-defeating – because they want to start new businesses, staff 
our labs, serve in our military, and otherwise contribute to the country we love. … and it 
is cruel” (Edelman, 2017). Many DREAMers themselves also stressed the importance of 
their dynamic contributions to the economy in press interviews and statements.  
 Other challengers emphasized the moral and human rights implications of this 
decision. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which is Republican-aligned, said that the 
decision is "contrary to fundamental American principles and the best interests of our 
country,” appealing to the way many understand America’s foundational values (Pramuk, 
2017). In one protest, protestors chanted, “This is what community looks like,” 
emphasizing the vital part of our communities that DREAMers comprise (Shear and 
Davis, 2018). Protestors called upon America to consider its supposed values of 
welcoming all and being the land of opportunity. Others emphasized that Dreamers are 
doing the “right thing.” In an interview with the New York Times, a Dreamer said, "We 
just want to stay here and contribute to this country, to the economy. We are good people, 
we’re not criminals" (Shear and Davis, 2017).  
 Other protesters emphasized the innocence of children in a similar appeal to moral 
values. In a statement, John McCain said "I strongly believe that children who were 
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illegally brought into this country through no fault of their own should not be forced to 
return to a country they do not know" (Pramuk, 2017). Barack Obama chimed in along 
similar lines: "Let’s be clear: the action taken today isn’t required legally. It’s a political 
decision, and a moral question… We shouldn’t threaten the future of this group of young 
people who are here through no fault of their own, who pose no threat, who are not taking 
away anything from the rest of us” (Edelman, 2017).  
 Some called attention to the cruelty inherent in revoking a policy that provided 
hundreds of thousands of people with protection. In an interview with Kathy Sheehan, 
Mayor of Albany, NY, she stated that it is cruel to make a promise that encourages 
DREAMers to come out of the shadows and live more fully and then to rescind that and 
induce fear (Fox News, 2018). House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi called Trump's 
decision "cruel and heartless" (Pramuk, 2017). Many of the posters at protests and rallies 
invoked this idea to put shame on America for doing something that could separate 
families.  
 The numerous angles that protesters used to challenge Trump’s decision reflect 
framing by social movement actors. Frames can be defined as "schemata of 
interpretation" that enable individuals to "locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences 
within their life space and the world at large”(Goffman, 1974). Framing is a process used 
to make meaning out of the world and experiences in a way that is “intended to mobilize 
potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize 
antagonists” (Benford & Snow, 2000). When movement actors engage in framing, they 
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are advocating a particular interpretation of an event or experience, typically in hopes that 
it garners support and challenges adversaries.  
When one looks at the response to the decision to rescind DACA, a variety of 
frames emerge among opponents. Some focused in on the positive contributions to 
America by DREAMers, especially economic contributions. These actors moved the 
conversation away from polarizing political and moral beliefs about immigration and 
attempt to align their cause with a widely-shared belief in improving the U.S. economy. 
This framing may have helped the movement to appeal to a wider range of people, such 
as business owners, who feel as if they have a stake in the potential losses due to this 
policy. Other opponents attempted to bridge their opposition to the decision with concern 
for American values. Emphasizing the innocence of children and lack of choice tries to 
evoke sympathy from those who may otherwise by apathetic towards immigrants. 
Notably, these statements may also potentially drive a wedge between Dreamers—who 
are depicted as innocent and worthy—and their parents, who would not be considered 
worthy or deserving under this framing. Those who emphasized the cruelty of the 
decision to rescind DACA frame the act as objectively morally reprehensible, hoping to 
appeal to universal ideas such as fairness and justice. 
A question remains: Why did the Trump administration’s decision to end DACA 
cause as much uproar as it did in contrast to other immigration-related policies? One 
answer may be found by looking at what’s left out of the opposition’s framing. The issue 
was framed in a specific way that emphasized the lack of choice that Dreamers had in 
immigrating to the United States. This framing allowed people who are normally not 
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sympathetic to undocumented immigrants to get behind the movement because it 
emphasized the characteristic of innocence. What was less present in the protests that 
erupted following September 5th was a call for a long-term solution to protect all 
undocumented immigrants. It was somewhat common to see signs that say things such as 
‘No human being is illegal,’ which employ a more universal human rights and human 
dignity frame. But by and large this utopian framing was not the focus of the protests. 
One Dreamer interviewee stated that he was protesting with the goal of permanent 
protection, respect, and dignity for the immigrant community (Keneally, 2017). However, 
I would argue that the framing used during this particular moment in time does not 
necessarily encompass this goal. The protests were able to garner such widespread, 
bipartisan support because DREAMers were depicted as a type of immigrant who 
“deserve” their place in the U.S. The movement does not address their parents, for 
example, who are identified by many primarily with their decision to break U.S. law, 
rather than with empathy toward their situation. The framing that protestors used to 
support their cause was extremely effective in garnering the support of individuals from 
many different ideological backgrounds. However, it is worth nothing that the framework 
may be limited with regard to goals such as “protection, respect, and dignity for the 
immigrant community” by creating a dichotomy between a ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ 
immigrant. There is a clear conflict between deploying framing strategies that appeal to a 
wider range of potential supporters and deploying frames that risk alienating certain 
groups of people, but might be more aligned with the movement’s long-term ideals.  
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This discussion of the 2017 decision to rescind DACA by the Trump 
administration gives insight into the way that framing processes operate in the wake of 
significant political decisions. In the current political moment, considerable changes in 
immigration policy are being enacted at unprecedented rates. As a result, we’ve seen 
some level of increase in activity by social movement actors. Some of these groups and 
individuals have been fighting against anti-immigrant policies since previous 
administrations, and others have newly emerged in response to Trump. Going forward, 
this paper seeks to better understand the immigration rights landscape as it exists today. 
Specifically, I am interested in understanding how different types of social movement 
organizations (SMOs—which include non-profits, grassroots organizations, etc.) 
underneath the same umbrella movement construct blame, devise tactics, and mobilize 
adherents.  
The primary objective of these questions is to understand how leaders from 
different backgrounds recognize strategic opportunities to push for their organization’s 
goals. This can best be understood by examining each group’s framing strategies. There 
are a variety of sociological debates that address why leaders and groups might make the 
strategic choices that they do. This question is taken up by a variety of scholars who 
highlight different contributing factors: the external resource environment (J. D. 
McCarthy & Zald, 1973, 1977); organizational structure (Bartley, 2007; J. D. McCarthy 
& Zald, 1977; Piven & Cloward, 2012; Staggenborg, 1988); class differences (Leondar-
Wright, 2014b; Rose, 1997); age, and documentation status (Abrego, 2011; Negrón-
Gonzales, 2014; Patler, 2018; Seif, 2011).  
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This paper sets out to explore what framing strategies are being used in the 
immigrant rights movement and explore why SMOs adopt the framing strategies that they 
do. By extension, why do they reject other framing strategies? This paper will add to the 
field’s understanding of how leaders of SMOs who advocate for immigrant rights choose 
which strategic frameworks to organize around and identify opportunities to make 
change. This study will reveal if the various types of groups are united in their approach 
to immigration justice, or if there is conflict between SMOs and their aims. Furthermore, 
it aims to reveal how certain demographic and organizational factors affect these framing 
processes. This may reveal who frames the issue which way. Are immigrant community 
organizers interpreting the political landscape in a very different way than college-
educated non-profit professionals, for example? Scholars have explored why these 
groups’ interpretations and solutions may differ from one another due to class differences 
(Leondar-Wright, 2014b; Rose, 1997) and the availability of resources for different types 
of organizations (Bartley, 2007; J. D. McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Piven & Cloward, 2012; 
Staggenborg, 1988).  
These questions have powerful implications for organizers, policymakers, allies, 
and other stakeholders in the world of immigration policy in the U.S. The outcome of this 
analysis gives insight into how leaders of different groups—who are distinguished by 
many factors including class, age, immigration status, and education level—arrive at 
conclusions about what is ‘wrong’ about immigration policy today. It will pose many 
complex questions about social position and social movement aims. Returning to a 
previous example, if immigrants are interpreting the landscape one way, and white, non-
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profit professionals are arriving at very different conclusions, what does this suggest 
about how background impacts social movement activity? If undocumented youth and 
older documented immigrants hold conflicting frames, what does this suggest about the 
direction that the movement is heading in for the future? 
To explore these questions, I use a case study approach to compare eleven 
immigrant rights organizations in a city in the Northeast United States. A variety of types 
of SMOs are represented in this sample. These include well-funded non-profits that focus 
on public policy, immigrant-led grassroots organizations that rely on crowdfunding, an 
organization of lawyers that utilizes impact litigation, a mutual aid fund to pay bond for 
folks in immigration detention, and others. The research primarily uses discourse analysis 
of documents that each organization has put out publicly such as their websites, press 
releases, and videos. It is supplemented by four, in-depth semi-structured interviews with 
leaders of three of the organizations. The interviews and other discourse that I gathered 
have been qualitatively coded to identify the frames that are employed by social 
movement actors. My research question opens the door to exploring many factors that 
impact an organization’s outcomes, such as the age, education level, migration status, and 
ethnic background of leaders, as well as organizational structure and culture. The 
interplay of all of these factors affects the outcomes this research is interested in: framing 
processes and strategies. Thus, this study benefits greatly from the constructivist 
paradigm that a case study approach lends itself to. 
In the next few chapters, I will review the relevant literature on framing as it 
applies to social movements. I will then overview some theories that seek to explain why 
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groups may employ certain frames, such as resource mobilization theory. This section 
will also take a look at arguments about the role of professionalization and formalization 
in the social movement sector. I will then examine what scholars have proposed about the 
effects of social position—such as class and migration status—on movement activity. 
The following section will provide an overview of the history of immigrant rights 
mobilization in the U.S., including how it emerged, the contemporary challenges that it 
faces, and how this new research will add to our current understandings. The following 
section will describe my methodology and criteria for including and excluding groups in 
this analysis. It illustrates how I collected my data and how it was coded. The next 
chapters will discuss my results and analysis. It will articulate the frames that emerged in 
the case studies and theorize why particular groups employ the framing strategies that 
they do. Finally, the paper will conclude by posing some implications of this data for 
organizers, policymakers, and other stakeholders.   
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Chapter 1: Defining and Understanding Frames 
 As I described in the introductory chapter, this paper is interested in comparing 
framing strategies by social movement organizations (SMOs) as a means to better 
understand the dynamics of the immigrant rights movement. This chapter serves as a 
deeper introduction to framing by taking a close look at the contributions of some of the 
scholars who have developed our modern sociological understanding of this idea. I will 
review a variety of definitions of framing as well as describe different framing processes 
that groups may engage with. Later in this paper, these concepts will be used to analyze 
the frames utilized by my case study organizations. These theoretical understandings are 
helpful for assessing my research question about what types of immigrant rights groups 
employ which types of framing strategies and why. This chapter will explain why 
theories about framing came about in the first place and how they are used to better 
understand how movement actors push toward their goals. I will apply these concepts in 
my coding of discourse by eleven case study organizations to more adeptly characterize 
their framing strategies and assess the extent to which they’re useful for understanding 
the immigrant rights movement as a whole.  
The Emergence of Framing Literature 
 The concept of frames as they apply to this paper was first coined by Erving 
Goffman in 1974. His work focuses on the overall human experience: how do individuals 
perceive and make sense of their realities? In this foundational work, Goffman suggests 
at the outset that any one person’s experience of a given event is likely to be very 
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different from another person’s experience of it because to speak of any “current 
situation” is to pick out from many different things what’s important and what’s not 
(Goffman, 1974). For Goffman, the concept of a frame comes out of the idea that 
“definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principles of organization 
which govern events—at least social ones—and our subjective involvement in them” 
(1974, p. 10-11). This brings us towards his idea of the primary framework. Each primary 
framework, he suggests, “allows its user to locate, perceive, identify, and label a 
seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its terms” (Goffman, 1974, 
p. 21). That is to say that individuals perceive events in terms of a primary framework 
which operates as a way to describe and interpret the event to which it is applied. At any 
given time, there are millions of different stimuli for our brains to choose to acknowledge 
and mark as important. These primary frameworks help us to make sense of it all and 
take appropriate subsequent action. This theory operates on the individual level, but it has 
been adapted to apply to a wide range of social science disciplines including cognitive 
psychology (Bateson, 2000), discourse analysis (Tannen, 1993), communications (Pan & 
Kosicki, 1993; Scheufele, 1999), and policy studies (Triandafyllidou & Fotiou, 2017). 
Frames have become a landmark way of thinking about how humans make meaning and 
respond to their surroundings.  
 Benford and Snow adapted this theory to study social movements (1988, 1992, & 
2000). According to these scholars, “The recent proliferation of scholarship on collective 
action frames and framing processes in relation to social movements indicates that 
framing processes have come to be regarded, alongside resource mobilization and 
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political opportunity processes, as a central dynamic in understanding the character and 
course of social movements” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 611). As they articulated, 
theories about framing processes are among a variety of highly-regarded theories that try 
to understand why social movement actors make the choices that they make.  
These theories about framing came about because of a perceived gap in social movement 
literature. Early social movement theorists tended to simply describe ideology, treating it 
as given. Resource mobilization theory (McCarthy & Zald, 1977)—one of the 
fundamental theories of social movement literature—mostly treats a movement’s 
ideology as irrelevant to the outcomes it’s interested in. Benford and Snow found that 
these scholars were completely understating the way that social movements play an 
essential role in constructing meaning, beliefs, and values. That is to say, movements are 
not simply carrying existing ideologies, but are actively involved in producing meaning 
(i.e., interpreting, planning, and acting) for movement participants, bystanders, and 
antagonists (Benford & Snow, 2000). In addition, Benford and Snow were not satisfied 
with simply applying cognitive concepts—such as a mental schema—to social 
movements because they don’t capture the way that creating meaning is a collective, 
constructivist process that is negotiated by movement actors over time. Building off of 
these gaps in the scholarship, Benford and Snow view social movement actors as actively 
involved in the process of “meaning work” as signifying agents (D. A. Snow & Benford, 
1988). These actors produce meaning for their constituents as well as bystanders and 
observers in a similar way to the media and state and local governments (D. A. Snow & 
Benford, 1988). For example, during the presidency of Donald Trump thus far, certain 
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immigration policies have resulted in very public opposition and protest, while other anti-
immigrant policies have been enacted without much resistance from the general public. 
Immigrant rights organizations play a critical role in interpreting the meaning of policies 
and disseminating related information. Whereas certain policies could have been deemed 
meaningless or insignificant to much of the general public, organizations pick up on them 
and push forward a particular interpretation that gets their audience to view them as 
unjust or intolerable, which may result in mobilization. This is one way that organizations 
make meaning for their adherents and bystanders. In this theoretical understanding, 
ideological factors—such as values, beliefs, and meanings—are not given, but are 
constructed as movement participants interact (D. A. Snow & Benford, 1988).  
Defining Frames 
Frames are defined in a variety of constructive ways. Frames generally refer to the 
construction of meaning; they help to render events or occurrences significant and guide 
action (Benford & Snow, 2000). Collective action frames are the result of framing 
activity within entire movements; they similarly make meaning out of the world in a way 
that is “intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander 
support, and to demobilize antagonists” (D. A. Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 198). Benford 
and Snow describe collective action frames as an “action-oriented set of beliefs that 
inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization” 
(2000, p. 614). A collective action frame that exists for one of the groups in my analysis 
focuses on the lack of progress for immigrant rights that has occurred through legislative 
action, and thus puts its hopes in strikes and boycotts to demonstrate the necessity of 
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immigrants in the U.S. and build support. They place a strong emphasis on working 
outside of the electoral system and believe that the path forward involves building 
community power. This collective action frame understands immigrants as central to the 
economy of the U.S. and promotes campaigns that demonstrate their centrality, which has 
the potential to mobilize business owners, for example, to offer them support. 
Importantly, collective action frames result from negotiated meanings constructed 
actively by groups. They are not aggregates of individual perceptions, but come about as 
movement actors discuss and come to terms with a shared understanding about some 
situation or system in need of change (Benford & Snow, 2000).  
Collective action frames also include shared understandings about who or what is 
to blame for the issue at hand. This is called diagnostic framing, and disagreement about 
the locus of blame is a common source of distinction between SMOs. In the immigrant 
rights movement, certain groups place a great deal of blame on local law enforcement for 
cooperating with ICE and hastening deportations, while other groups are more concerned 
about federal policies and may actually encourage immigrant communities to build 
relationship with local law enforcment. The way that each of these groups diagnoses who 
is to blame for deportations greatly impacts who they cooperate with, who they 
antagonize, and what types of campaigns they rally around.  
Benford and Snow put forward some other “core framing tasks” that describe 
SMOs’ framing processes. Prognostic framing refers to the articulation of a solution to 
the identified issue as well as a strategy for how to achieve that solution (Benford & 
Snow, 2000). A clear-cut example is how one SMO may see fighting for legislative bills 
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and meeting with policymakers as the path forward for immigration rights, while others 
may see a need for building community power and engaging in more disruptive direct 
action. Motivational framing occurs as groups try to mobilize individuals in their 
struggle. This includes “calls to action” and justification for folks to engage in collective 
action. Such framing may toggle with language around urgency and severity (Benford & 
Snow, 2000). For example, when the Trump administration enacted policies that allowed 
and encouraged family separation at the border, groups used motivational framing 
strategies to emphasize the urgency of keeping families together and not allowing 
children to ‘get lost’ in the bureaucracy of detention centers.  
  How can SMOs get members of their community to care about immigrant rights? 
How do they convince them that their strategy is the most effective one? These questions 
tap into the very practical question of rallying sustained support. This study will dive 
deep into variations in diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing that exist in the 
SMOs in the Northeast U.S. city selected for this case study. Based on Benford and 
Snow’s hypothesis, groups are expected to vary in how they identify the problem as well 
as how broad or narrow they are in terms of the number of ideas they incoporate (Benford 
& Snow, 2000).  These are useful terms for evaluating and comparing the various groups’ 
framing processes. 
 Benford and Snow put forward a set of three other processes that groups proceed 
through while attending to their core framing tasks. Discursive processes include all of 
the discourse that a group puts forward, including speeches, social media, press releases, 
and other written communications (Benford & Snow, 2000). These serve to connect and 
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align the events and experiences that this group wants to highlight so that observers are 
led to understand them in light the group’s overall frame. Importantly, groups utilize 
strategic processes. These are framing processes that are deliberate on the part of the 
group and are used to achieve that group’s particular goals. The first strategic process is 
frame bridging, which involves linking two structurally disconnected but ideologically 
compatible frames, often through a group’s outreach and information diffusion. (D. A. 
Snow et al., 1986). An example of this could be an SMO that chooses to highlight the 
connection between their movement to abolish ICE with the movement to abolish prisons 
as a whole. The second process is frame amplification. This refers to the “idealization, 
embellishment, clarification, or invigoration of existing values or beliefs” (Benford & 
Snow, 2000, p. 624). Movement actors call upon basic or universal values, such as justice 
or fairness. Family values are often called upon within the immigrant rights movement—
such as in the wake of the family separation policies—to urge bystanders and opponents 
to look past notions of nationality and empathize with the shared value of keeping 
families together. Frame extension, the third strategy, is used to enlarge a group’s 
adherent pool by presenting its interests as aligned with those of the constituents it’s 
trying to reach (Snow et al., 1986). If a groups that advocates for working-class 
immigrants suspects that participants in the labor movement would be sympathetic to 
their cause, they may work to present their goals as aligned with those of the labor 
movement. The final strategy is frame transformation, in which movement actors try to 
create new understandings and beliefs that often challenge old understandings and ways 
of living. A group may observe a widely-held belief that immigrants held in detention are 
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criminals and undertake a campaign dedicated to unraveling this conflation through 
releasing the personal stories of otherwise law-abiding citizens who were placed in 
detention. These four strategic processes are laid out consisely in the table below.  
 
Frame bridging: 
The linking of two 
ideologically 
compatible but 
structurally 
disconnected 
frames.  
This can occur at the 
organizational 
level—between 
SMOs of the same 
movement—or on 
the individual level 
through a group’s 
outreach and 
diffusion of 
information (D. A. 
Snow et al., 1986). 
 
 
Frame  
amplification: 
The “idealization, 
embellishment, 
clarification, or 
invigoration of 
existing values or 
beliefs” (Benford & 
Snow, 2000, p. 624). 
Values can include 
those that are 
considered basic to 
prospective 
constituents. Beliefs 
can include those 
about the urgency of 
the issue, the locus 
of blame, or the need 
to stand together (D. 
A. Snow et al., 
1986). 
 
 
Frame extension:  
This involves 
aligning the 
current frame with 
larger issues and 
concerns that may 
be of interest to an 
SMO’s adherent 
pool and potential 
adherents. A 
group may be 
trying to enlarge 
its participant pool 
by presenting its 
interests as 
aligned with those 
of the constituents 
it’s trying to reach 
(Snow et al., 
1986).  
 
 
Frame 
transformation:  
Generating new 
understandings and 
challenging 
previously held 
beliefs or 
conventional ways 
of living. 
 
 
Example: 
Highlighting the 
connection between 
a movement to 
abolish ICE with the 
movement to 
abolish prisons as a 
whole. 
Example:  
Protesters of the 
decision to rescind 
DACA appealing to 
ideas of fairness and 
justice by emphasizing
how cruel it is to 
revoke a policy that 
promised individuals 
that they would be 
protected. 
Example: 
A group that 
focuses on 
advocating for 
working-class 
immigrants 
presenting its 
cause as 
connecting with 
the goals of the 
labor movement. 
Example: 
A group running a 
campaign 
dedicated to 
unraveling the 
conflation between 
immigrant 
detention and crime 
by releasing the 
anecdotal stories of 
law-abiding 
citizens who were 
put in detention.  
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 The final processes that Benford and Snow (2000) suggest occur within SMOs are 
contested processes. These scholars believe that the generation of collective action 
frames is a contested process which arises from navigating framing contests between 
groups (such as reacting to counterframing by opponents) as well as framing disputes 
within movements (Benford & Snow, 2000). There has been heavy counter-mobilization 
and repression during the short history of the immigrant rights movement. According to 
an analysis by López-Sanders and Brown (2020), following the 2006 protests, English-
language press in South Carolina began to increasingly identify immigrants as 
‘Mexicans’ and presented them as a cultural threat and a drain on U.S. resources. This 
corresponded with increased political influence of anti-immigrant groups in the state 
(Bloemraad & Voss, 2020). Repression is also incredibly prominent in the administration 
of Donald Trump, which employs various types of repressive tools: from xenophobic 
rhetoric to explicitly anti-immigrant policies and executive orders. Movement actors must 
navigate the successes and increased resources of countermovements and reach toward 
ways to counteract them.  
Collective action frames are also responding to the social and cultural context 
within which they arise. One of the most fundamental claims of social movement 
literature is that protest is not separate from institutional politics; rather, collective action 
is connected to changes which leave “the broader political system more vulnerable or 
receptive to the demands of particular groups” (McAdam and Snow, 1997, p. 334). This 
is called the political opportunity structure. Bloemraad and Voss (2020) observe that 
there has been little attention given to understanding the relationship between political 
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opportunity structure and the immigrant rights activism, and what does exist suggests that 
the relationship is inconsistent at best. Importantly, they note that within the current 
literature, “the line between threat as a motivation to action or a source of repression 
appears thin” (Bloemraad and Voss, 2020, p. 693). That is, threatening political shifts 
have sometimes produced action (such as the large-scale 2006 protests in response to 
H.R. 4437) and other times haven’t (such as various anti-immigrant bills passed under the 
Trump administration). However, Nicholls (2014) does suggest that immigrants can 
sometimes make successful claims for greater rights even during inhospitable political 
conditions by finding niche openings. For example, he argues that undocumented youth 
found a niche opening in the federal system by arguing that since they were educated in 
the U.S., brought to the U.S. as children, and have absorbed U.S. values that they are 
particularly deserving of legalization in their fight for DACA (Nicholls, 2014). As 
previously discussed, the limit of this strategy comes in its privileging of certain 
immigrants with those attributes while contributing to further repression of anyone who 
does not possess these characteristics.  
Overall, the immigrant rights movement is in the position to respond to the 
political opportunity structures provided by both the federal and the state levels, as states 
and localities have the authority to deny or extend certain benefits and protections to 
immigrants. However, as Bloemraad and Voss (2020) note, “niche openings and differing 
political opportunities at the local and federal levels legitimates some activists and 
claimants over others” (p. 694), thus potentially driving some tension between the claims 
of national and grassroots groups.  
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Cultural opportunities and constraints refer to the cultural resources from which 
movements draw to push forward their goals including beliefs, ideologies, and narratives 
that exist ‘out there’ (Benford & Snow, 2000). Similar to political opportunity structure, 
cultural opportunities also constrains and facilitates movement activities. Collective 
action frames are not created in a vacuum, but respond to each and every one of these 
external and internal factors. With significant political changes, for example, groups may 
be compelled to do some reframing so that their messaging connects more with the new 
reality of potential adherents. I suspect that many groups underwent reframing processes 
upon the election of Donald Trump in 2016 to respond to new threats and challenges 
posed by his anti-immigrant stances. 
Reframing connects with Benford and Snow’s idea of frame resonance. In 
general, this concept assesses the extent to which a given frame is effective at mobilizing 
adherents. When are framing efforts actually effective and when are they constrained? 
Some frames may be effective for a while, and lose their effectiveness over time due to 
changes in political or cultural opportunity strucutres. To diagnose the “mobilizing 
potency of frames,” Benford and Snow discuss four factors to consider (1988). The first 
is how well movement actors develop and connect the core framing tasks—diagnostic, 
prognostic and motivational—to present a cohesive message that adherents can get 
behind. If potential adherents find an immigrant rights frame to be contradictory or 
disjointed in terms of its approach, they are less likely to want to rally behind it.  
Benford and Snow then consider external constraints. How central and urgent are 
the beliefs at hand to the adherent pool? After the election of Donald Trump in 2016, for 
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example, standing up for immigrant rights became a central concern for many liberal and 
progressive individuals in the United States due to strong anti-immigrant rhetoric in 
Trump’s campaign. However, will the frames that were developed over these past four 
years still be as effective if a Democrat is elected for president in 2020? There still may 
very well be threats to immigrant rights if a Democrat is elected, but it’s likely that many 
folks will no longer have the same sense of urgency around these issues as they had under 
the more explicit and direct threats posed by the Trump administration. Immigrant rights 
groups may have to reframe to emphasize the threats that still exist in a way that 
resonates under the new political arrangements.  
In a similar vein, Benford and Snow pose the question of how relevant movement 
framing is to individuals’ lived experiences: does this framing fit into their lives and help 
them explain the world around them? Or is it too abstract? Does the framing have 
empirical credibility? These questions put frames through the test of practicality and 
assesses how likely individuals are to see the frame as relevant to their understanding of 
the world. Finally, Benford and Snow look at the timeline of when frames emerge 
because they believe that it affects how constrained they are. They argue that frames that 
emerge earlier in a cycle of protest actually function to color future movements, while 
frames that emerge later in cycles of protest are constrained by the pre-existing “master 
frame” and may not resonate as strongly with adherents (Snow & Benford, 1992). 
Nicholls (2014) argues that, early on, immigrant rights organizations and undocumented 
youth crafted a representation of young immigrants that rested on notions of 
‘Americanness’ (through American symbols and narratives of cultrual assimilation) and 
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hard work. This helped these young people to be seen as an exceptional group, no longer 
a threat to American values, and thus entitled to legalization. Nicholls argues that these 
themes formed the master frame from which groups have since drawn to assert rights 
claims in the public sphere (2014). If Benford and Snow’s proposition reigns true, the 
existence of this early master frame constrains the resonance of future frames that 
challenge it or take another route. The more intersectional frames that are used by many 
undocumented youth organizations today (ones that are more inclusive of immigrants 
with criminal records, for example) challenge this master frame, and could face 
difficulties in attracting groups of adherents due to early, lasting salience of the previous 
deservingness frame.  
 My analysis will take these aspects of framing processes and apply them to the 
data that I have collected through my case studies on eleven immigrant rights 
organizations. My work is in the company of other scholars who have worked to identify 
and the diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framings that exist among SMOs in 
various movements (Benford 1993, Marullo et al 1996, Meyer 1995). Importantly, my 
analysis seeks to explain why groups employ the framing strategies that they do. Now 
having introduced framing, the following chapters will dive into a host of theories that 
could help answer this explanatory question. The following chapter will explore resource 
mobilization theory and how scholars operating out of this perspective may understand 
framing strategies. It will then take a closer look at organizational structure and culture—
specifically the professionalization and formalization of organizations—and discuss how 
scholars expect this to impact a group’s framing processes. The essay will then turn to 
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theories about social position and background—including class, migration status, and 
age—to bring even more nuance to how framing processes develop.  
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Chapter 2: Resource Mobilization and Organizational Structure 
 The study of social movements first gained traction in academia in the 1950s. 
Since then, a variety of scholars have theorized about the mobilization process. How do 
individuals with shared grievances get together to collectively take action? How do 
problems come to be defined as those worth mobilizing around? What are the strategic 
dilemmas that social movement actors face? These are some of the many core questions 
that theorists have tried to parse out. Because this paper is concerned with the strategic 
processes employed by social movement organizations, this literature review will start by 
discussing how various scholars speculate why actors make the choices that they do. 
 Early theories of social movements generally understood social movements to 
arise as a result of preexisting collective grievances and beliefs. Most of the early 
theorists clung to the idea that movements arose from an change in the magnitude, 
intensity, or tolerability of shared grievances or deprivations among a certain population 
(J. McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Under this framework, collective action is only possible 
when a collectivity shares a grievance and holds similar views about the causes of this 
issue and perhaps the means of reducing or eliminating it. Theorists in this line of thought 
include Gurr (1970), Turner and Killian (1957), and Smelser (1963). Although these 
authors put forward distinct theories, they all operate from the idea that movements erupt 
from objective, collective grievances. 
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The Emergence of Resource Mobilization Theory 
 McCarthy and Zald (1977) took issue with the idea that discontent alone produces 
a movement. They believe that previous perspectives ignore structural factors and focus 
too much on the psychological state of movement supporters. They quote Turner and 
Killian (1972) who wrote about the need to look at a population’s central political 
processes to understand movement behavior: "…there is always enough discontent in any 
society to supply the grass-roots support for a movement if the movement is effectively 
organized and has at its disposal the power and resources of some established elite group" 
(p. 251). In the context of the immigrant rights movement, Turner and Killian would 
argue that there are always enough folks who are angry or frustrated about the lack of 
rights for immigrants in the country, and there are also enough individuals who oppose 
the advancement of immigrant rights. But these grievances alone will not spark 
movement activity. Activity will only come about if a group sees it appropriate or 
possible to organize around these grievances, given the political climate, and if they’re 
able to attract elite resources and support. McCarthy and Zald add that grievances may 
even be defined or manipulated by issue organizations, which becomes a more central 
line of thought in later theories (1977).  
Resource mobilization theory attempts to fill previous gaps by focusing on the 
external resource environment within which movements arise and operate. This 
perspective holds that movements are more likely to arise if those who share a common 
grievance or preference are already organized in some way, such as communally or 
associationally (J. McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Thus, those who share preferences but are 
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structurally disconnected are unlikely to collectively organize. McCarthy and Zald draw 
on economic theory to explain collective behavior: they pay attention to factors such as 
incentives and cost-reduction/efficiency. They understand movements to be competing 
for a limited amount of resources. These include tangible resources—such as money 
(funding), time, cultural capital (skills), social capital (networks), and facilities—as well 
as intangible resources, such as legitimacy in the public eye.  
 In the resource mobilization perspective, movements are not necessarily 
comprised of the labor and resources of those who are actually affected by the given 
issue. Rather, “Conscience constituents, individual and organizational, may provide 
major sources of support. And in some cases, supporters—those who provide money, 
facilities, and even labor—may have no commitment to the values that underlie specific 
movements” (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, p. 1216). Conscience constituents refers to direct 
supporters of a movement who do not stand to benefit from the movement’s goals (J. 
McCarthy & Zald, 1977). In the immigrant rights movement, these have historically 
included non-immigrant activists, many of whom are involved with religious 
organizations, labor unions, and civic associations (Nicholls et al., 2020). While the old 
tradition viewed a movement’s choice of tactics and activities to depend on factors such 
as ideology and previous success with certain strategies, McCarthy and Zald assert that 
choosing tactics is impacted by a number of strategic considerations that groups have to 
make. These may include “mobilizing supporters, neutralizing and/or transforming mass 
and elite publics into sympathizers, achieving change in target” (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, 
p. 1217). Choosing tactics may cause dilemmas when achieving one of the 
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aforementioned goals conflicts with achieving another. In striving to achieve any number 
of these goals, an SMO’s framing strategies may be adjusted. For example, if an SMO 
relies on conscience constituents for funding, they are tasked to frame things in a way 
that would appeal to this audience and encourage them to contribute more funds. The 
implications of such a shift in framing are discussed in more detail later in this chapter in 
the debate regarding the effects of professionalization on a group’s framing processes. 
Overall, society provides the infrastructure upon which movements draw to 
achieve their goals. The external environment influences things like what type of 
communication methods are available, expenses, adherents’ levels of affluence, access to 
institutions and facilities, and preexisting networks (J. McCarthy & Zald, 
1977).  McCarthy and Zald make a strong case for examining all of these external factors 
when attempting to understand an SMO’s framing choices. In the immigrant rights 
movement, funds may be limited due to some of the barriers that immigrants face in civic 
participation. Bloemraad and Voss (2020) argue that: 
“Often, social movement ‘challengers’ are marginalized from centers of power 
because they are resource-poor. Relative to the general population, challengers’ 
education levels might be lower, with implications for civic leadership and 
political efficacy; financial resources also tend to be more limited. Indeed, a 
significant proportion of immigrants face these hardships, especially those in 
precarious legal statuses.” (p. 691) 
 
Immigrants’ status as challenges and having relatively limited resources caused the 
immigrant rights move to turn to creating coalitions of schools, churches, unions, civic 
associations, and hometown associations that came together across cities and 
communities in the 2006 protests to translate their political aims into collective action 
(Bloemraad & Voss, 2020). Thus, the availability of infrastructure from which to draw 
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may pose a particularly strong challenge for immigrants who are organizing for their 
rights due to variables like legal status, education levels, and language barriers 
(Bloemraad & Voss, 2020).  
 McCarthy and Zald also suggest a variety of useful terminology for talking about 
social movements and their participants that I will employ going forward. A social 
movement refers to “a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents 
preferences for changing some elements of the social structure” (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, 
p. 1217-1218). At narrower level of analysis appears social movement organizations 
(SMOs). These are the organizations that comprise a social movement and are united by a 
broad issue area—in the case of this paper, this would be the rights of immigrants in the 
U.S. The movement of which the SMOs are a part is called a social movement sector 
(SMS). For example, some well-known national SMOs that embody the broad goal of 
rights for immigrants in the United States include the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU), United We Dream, the National Immigration Law Center, and UnidosUS. In the 
context of this paper, all of the organizations that I’ve chosen for my case studies are 
considered SMOs as part of the immigrant rights movement. Despite them each having 
their own specific goals and approaches, they are all united by identifying as fighting for 
the rights of immigrants in the United States.  
To refer to the various participants in a movement, McCarthy and Zald draw a 
distinction between adherents and constituents. The former are all those involved with a 
movement who support the goals of the movement (J. McCarthy & Zald, 1977). The 
latter refers to those who provide resources to the SMO. Adherents and constituents may 
 30 
or may not actually stand to benefit from the goals of the group. Those who participate or 
support but are not beneficiaries of the goal are called conscience adherents and 
conscience constituents. In the immigrant rights movement, conscience adherents and 
conscious constituents may be U.S.-born individuals who want to support immigrant 
rights in the United States, despite not directly benefitting from the achievement of these 
goals. 
 Circling back to the task of an SMO under the resource mobilization perspective, 
McCarthy and Zald suggest that any given SMO has a set of target goals, or preferred 
changes, that they are working towards and must possess resources (ex: legitimacy, 
money, labor, facilities) to work towards those goals (J. McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Such 
resources must be controlled or mobilized prior to action, and an SMO’s activity toward 
accomplishing their goal is a direct function of their control of resources (J. McCarthy & 
Zald, 1977). Given these conditions, McCarthy and Zald suggest that any given SMO’s 
task is to convert adherents into constituents and maintain constituents’ involvement (J. 
McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Groups may achieve this through a wide variety of strategies, 
such as expanding their target goals to appeal to a wider range of potential beneficiaries, 
working to target bystander publics (those who are not adherents but are not opposed to 
the movement) into adherents, or by appealing to conscience constituents. Any of these 
strategies to compete for a pool of limited resources may affect a group’s framing 
strategies. The undocumented youth who worked toward passing the DREAM act after 
the election of Former President Obama employed a framing strategy that appealed to a 
wide range of adherents by emphasizing the economic and cultural contributions of 
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undocumented youth and presenting their continued presence as aligned with 
fundamental American values. This strategic framing brought support to the movement 
from subsectors of the U.S. population who may have not have previously viewed 
immigrant rights as a cause worth mobilizing around. By utilizing this framing and 
gaining the support of a wider group of participants, the movement was able to attain 
many more resources, including legitimacy and funds. As groups’ resource needs change, 
they may decide to adjust their framing processes to appeal to a larger audience or a new 
subset of the population.  
Impact of Organizational Structure and Culture 
In line with their observations about the effects of the external resource 
environment on an organization’s decision-making, McCarthy and Zald also theorized 
about the explicit role of professionalization and formalization of SMOs. One of their 
most highly-quoted assertions is that the resource mobilization approach to collective 
action is associated with formalized organizations. They argue that due to the availability 
of more funding for movement activists to make a career out of activism, SMOs are more 
likely to formalize their leadership and structure. With a larger income flow to an SMO, 
the more their organizational maintenance requires skills such as lobbying, accounting, 
and fundraising (J. McCarthy & Zald, 1977). This process leads to professionalization. 
They also suggest that this professionalization is becoming more common among SMOs, 
as funding sources become more readily available for activists to make a career of their 
activism. The immigrant rights movement has seen a ‘scaling up’ to more 
professionalized, national organizations since 2006 (Nicholls et al., 2020). Given the 
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political opportunity structure for immigrant activists that limits access to civic 
institutions and certain job opportunities, this could mean that the movement is being co-
opted by non-immigrant activists who are more able to make a career out of organizing. 
McCarthy and Zald theorize about the effects of professionalization on movement 
participation. They observe that SMOs with professional leadership have “paper” 
memberships—that is, nonexistent or flimsy membership—and mostly rely on 
conscience constituents for resources. They argues that the role of active membership to a 
movement has become reduced, and SMOs have become more concerned with acquiring 
financial resources from constituents. Contributing financially to a movement is 
considered a “low-risk” form of participation. Thus, a shift in focus and membership due 
to professionalization may have an impact on an SMO’s strategies and engagement 
tactics.  
Another aspect of McCarthy and Zald’s theory has to do with the role of 
professional activists in ‘manufacturing’ grievances. They argue that, in response to the 
availability of resources, movement professionals become movement “entrepreneurs” 
who start new (formalized) organizations in which to work. Under this perspective, the 
evolution of new movements or SMOs is greatly independent from the presence of 
grievances and more directly correlated with the availability of resources for movement 
professionals. This argument has been challenged “on grounds of lack of evidence that 
professional managers and their SMOs originate insurgent challenges, although they may 
play a role in representing unorganized groups in more established interest group 
politics” (Staggenborg, 1988, p. 590). The consequences for the immigrant rights 
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movement may thus take one of two forms based on these theories: 1.) Professionals 
manufacture grievances to further their professional goals that may not align with the 
actual grievances of their base, or 2.) Reliance and dependency of foundations due to 
professionalization cause professionals not to take up new or different grievances of their 
base that could challenge their funding structure, even if originating this challenge would 
expand their base.  
 Since the publishing of these theories, their thoughts on the role of 
professionalization and formalization have been expanded on and criticized by a variety 
of scholars. Staggenborg is one such scholar who expanded their ideas and tested them 
against a social movement sector: the pro-choice movement in the 1980s. She examines 
the effects of organizational leadership and structure through conducting case studies on 
thirteen pro-choice movement organizations. Building off of McCarthy and Zald’s 
assertion that different types of SMOs require different levels and types of participation, 
she argues that, “the professionalization of social movements and activists does not 
necessarily help expand the social movement sector by initiating activities and 
organizations, but that professionalization and formalization importantly affect the 
structure and maintenance of social movement organizations, their strategies and tactics, 
and their participation in coalition work” (Staggenborg, 1988, p. 586).  
Her article poses a few challenges to McCarthy and Zald. First, she disagrees with 
McCarthy and Zald’s idea that movement professionals and become movement 
entrepreneurs. In her analysis, these are distinct types of activists who play different roles 
in the social movement sector. Also contrary to McCarthy and Zald, she argues that 
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“nonprofessional leaders and informal SMOs remain important in initiating movements 
and tactics that are critical to the growth of insurgency” (Staggenborg, 1988, p. 603). As 
Nicholls et al. argue (2020), “The immigrant rights movement in the United States 
evolved from largely localized and grassroots struggles in the 1990s into a coherent and 
coordinated national social movement in the late 2000s and 2010s. Scaling up in this way 
is challenging because grassroots organizations tend to lack the resources needed to 
operate at the national level over an extended period” (p. 705). While McCarthy and Zald 
may see the increased prominence of national, professionalized organizations as a 
challenge to the influence and success of grassroots organizations, Staggenborg would 
argue that grassroots organizations may still contribute greatly to the growth of the 
movement. This may be especially true since both federal and local policies determine 
the rights and protections of immigrants in the U.S., so grassroots groups may have a 
stronger voice in local matters than national groups.  
There are a few main consequences of formalization that she suggests that do not 
necessarily pose a challenge to McCarthy and Zald, but build off of their work and 
contextualize it. Firstly, formalized SMOs seem to be able to maintain themselves over a 
longer period of time than informal SMOs (Staggenborg, 1988). One of the reasons for 
this pattern is that foundations and other distributors of elite support prefer dealing with 
organizations that have formalized structures and professional leaders. In addition, a 
formalized structure enables and encourages an organization to continue to solicit these 
resources because they have the organizational capacity to facilitate this. Their structure 
better prepares them to take advantage of elite preferences and environmental changes, as 
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compared to informal organizations who are less prepared to adapt to constituent 
concerns.  
In terms of formalization’s effect on strategies and tactics, Staggenborg situates 
her argument against the backdrop of Piven and Cloward’s 1977 thesis that large, 
formalized organizations defuse protest. Staggenborg disagrees with this assertion, 
arguing that they indeed play an important function especially following-up from the 
protest victories of informal movements. However, Staggenborg’s work supports Piven 
and Cloward’s argument that formalization leads to a decline in militant, direct-action 
tactics (1977). She observes that formalized SMOs tend to engage in institutional tactics 
and frequently stay away from disruptive, direct-action tactics. Staggenborg describes 
two processes: the first is that as movements are pushed to work in the institutional arena, 
they tend to formalize so that they can engage in institutional activities such as lobbying 
(a process reminiscent of McCarthy and Zald’s resource mobilization argument). In 
addition, “once SMOs are formalized, institutionalized tactics are preferred because they 
are more compatible with a formalized structure and with the schedules of professional 
activists” (Staggenborg, 1988, p. 599).  
Finally, Staggenborg argues that formalized SMOs are more likely to engage with 
and maintain successful coalition work. This is because they are more likely to have 
dedicated staff to represent the organization and maintain these relationships. It is unclear 
whether or not this is true for the immigrant rights movement. Coalitions have long 
characterized the immigrant rights movement and have often been formed from civic 
associations, unions, churches, families, schools, and hometown associations (Bloemraad 
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& Voss, 2020). A 2020 study of unions in San Francisco, Houston, and Chicago reveals 
that unions have increased their involvement with grassroots immigrant rights groups in 
all three cities and have contributed to the continued prominence of the immigrant rights 
movement and have successfully fought some state and federal anti-immigrant laws (de 
Graauw et al.). This may pose a challenge to Staggenborg’s assertion and suggest the 
potential of developing grassroots coalitions that have the opportunity to effectively 
coordinate various parts of a community. 
Staggenborg concludes that formalization may help to sustain social movements, 
but it leads to the institutionalization of action. However, she does not readily accept that 
this leads groups to become less radical, but suggests that perhaps their demands and 
goals become incorporated into institutional life. It could be that these groups have a role 
in shifting what is seen as legitimate in institutionalized politics.  There has been a trend 
toward formalization in her analysis, but she notes that the line between informal and 
formal is considerably blurred in many cases, and that many groups do not fit this pattern 
of informal to formal. Staggenborg’s contributions help to explain SMOs’ framing 
processes by highlighting the explicit effects of professionalization that she found in her 
analysis. Although she does not address framing directly, some of the consequences of 
formalization that she suggests—including institutionalization and moderation of 
strategies and tactics—are intimately connected with a group’s framing processes. In 
addition, her ideas about a stronger relationship between elites and formalized SMOs is 
likely to have strong effects on framing processes as these groups work to sustain elite 
support by adapting to their preferences.  
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Another response to McCarthy and Zald comes from Everett (1992), who 
analyzes social movement trends post-1961 to look for patterns related to 
professionalization and formalization. His work shows that inter-organizational relations 
have become more dense as the number and differentiation of organizations has increased 
(Everett, 1992). Importantly, he observes moderation among groups in terms of tactics 
and ideology during this time period that he studies. He attributes this moderation to 
groups’ efforts to expand their appeal, which resulted in increased participation. A 
precursor to his work is McCarthy and Zald’s hypothesis that the role of membership 
decreases as groups professionalize. Everett finds this to be true and proposes that low-
risk means of participation and appealing to a wider constituency may be a good thing 
because 1.) it can invigorate and build solidarity and allegiance among members, and 2.) 
protest events—and especially those which receive strong media coverage—can sustain 
membership involvement and help to attract new supporters (Everett, 1992). In agreeance 
with Staggenborg (1988) he notes that professionalized groups dedicate more energy 
towards maintenance and preservation, which may help to explain the tendency of groups 
to lower the risk of participation and widen their appeal (Everett, 1992). Although 
Everett’s argument is supported by the social movement industry that emerges in the 60s, 
70s, and 80s (which was largely influenced by political events and the growth of the new 
middle class), his ideas and observations still have relevance to the study of social 
movements today. His work helps to explain why groups may moderate their tactics and 
ideologies and pushes scholars to pay deeper attention to how SMOs function as part of 
an entire ecosystem and look for patterns that emerge as a result.  
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A final perspective in the realm of professionalization comes from Bartley (2007) 
who assesses the role of foundations on social movements and the trajectory of social 
change. Bartley acknowledges that various scholars before him have argued that the 
involvement of foundations and elite support tends to push SMOs to pursue less radical 
tactics and strategies, but he suggests that the process by which this happens is 
underdeveloped (2007). Bartley notes that “while early versions of resource mobilization 
theory portrayed elite support as a prerequisite for the emergence of robust movements 
(McCarthy and Zald, 1977), critics argued that elites were primarily reactive to grassroots 
activism and acted in the interest of “cooling out” movements’ most radical elements 
(Haines, 1984; McAdam, 1982)” (Bartley, 2007, p. 229). Although Bartley 
foundationally agrees with these early theorists, he does not think that this idea of simple 
“social control” by elites is well-supported; he instead argues that foundations are 
channeling movement activity. He summarizes two mechanisms that earlier scholars tend 
to fall back upon: the first being that foundations and other elites tend to support more 
moderate organizations, thus ‘cherry-picking’ from existing SMOs and ignoring more 
radical, grassroots movements. The second proposed mechanism is that foundation 
funding transforms SMOs over time because it (directly or indirectly) encourages groups 
to adopt a more bureaucratic division of labor and professionalized staff, and meanwhile 
encourages dependence on donor funding which leads to less grassroots funding efforts 
(Bartley, 2007). Both of these mechanisms can be seen in earlier arguments that I’ve 
presented.  
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However, Bartley suggests that these explanations overlook what’s actually 
occurring as a result of elite support: the creation of an organization field colored by elite 
preferences that enrolls SMOs of the same umbrella movement into one collective 
project. He explains, “beyond selecting and professionalizing SMOs, foundations often 
play the role of ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ that champion a particular model of social 
order and attempt to build new arenas of social life—that is, new organizational fields—
to institutionalize that model” (Bartley, 2007, p. 231). Foundations are thus “field-
builders” (Bartley, 2007). In this way, foundations contribute largely to shaping social 
movements by creating a field that yields a particular construction and understanding of a 
social problem. Bartley suggests, “Building an organizational field entails fostering inter-
organizational networks, promoting particular conceptions of appropriate action (or field 
frames), and enrolling others into a collective project” (Bartley, 2007, p. 249). He is 
calling attention to the way that foundations play a role in creating meaning and 
constructing certain practices and activities as legitimate and others as inappropriate or 
illegitimate. Thus, foundations may play a role in movement framing as a whole by 
leveraging their power to promote a particular interpretation of events, activities, and 
social change.  
Given that previous researchers have suggested that SMOs’ embeddedness in a 
multi-organizational field shapes their goals, strategies, and organizational forms that 
carry legitimacy (Clemens 1993; Ganz 2000; Wilde 2004), Bartley’s work draws 
attention to how foundations shape the character of SMOs’ embeddedness. As this paper 
unfolds and dives deeper into an understanding of framing processes, it asks questions 
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derivative of Bartley’s work to understand how the field in which the immigrant rights 
movement exists may be shaped and constructed as a result of foundations and elite 
support. 
Categorizing Formal and Informal SMOs 
 Another contribution made by Staggenborg that is worth noting and parsing out is 
a useful way of defining and categorizing types of organizations and leaders.  In her 
analysis, professional managers refer to paid staff who make careers out of movement 
work and are likely to jump from movement to movement throughout the course of their 
careers (Staggenborg, 1988). In contrast stand nonprofessional leaders, who can either be 
unpaid, volunteer leaders, or nonprofessional staff leaders. These are leaders who are 
compensated for some of their time but do not make a career of their activism 
(Staggenborg, 1988). Some may behave similarly to professional staff if they are 
dependent on this income, but others will behave more like volunteers. They may serve 
as part of an SMO staff for a short period of time. Staggenborg argues that 
nonprofessional leaders are more likely to initiate movements (not other SMOs) and 
tactics than are professionals.  
 In terms of categorizing movement organizations, Staggenborg describes 
formalized SMOs as those which have “established procedures or structures that enable 
them to perform certain tasks routinely and to continue to function with changes in 
leadership” (Staggenborg, 1988, p. 587). Other features of formalized SMOs include 
bureaucratic decision-making structures, strong divisions of labor, explicit membership 
criteria, and rules regarding the existence and functioning of chapters, federations, or 
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committees, such as boards of directors. They are associated with professionalized 
leadership. In contrast, informal SMOs have few established procedures, minimal 
divisions of labor, and loose requirements for membership. Decision-making tends to 
occur in an ad hoc manner and their organizational structure may be frequently adjusted 
to meet immediate needs. Responsibilities and procedures can be delegated in response to 
environmental changes and new needs. In addition, the individuals who act as leaders 
have stronger influence on the organization’s functioning than they do in formalized 
structures, and change in leadership may cause major changes in the activities and 
structure of an SMO. In Staggenborg’s analysis, she used these categorizations to label 
the thirteen SMOs that she studied to understand their division of labor and 
organizational structure. As I will describe in my methodology section, these categories 
were used to code my case study organizations.  
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Chapter 3: Social Position and Demographic Features 
In the last chapter I reviewed some ways that scholars suggest that the external 
resource environment and organizational structure affect movement outcomes. These 
factors are expected to have strong effects on SMO framing processes, since framing is 
one way for groups to respond to the incentives and challenges that these scholars 
discuss. However, these theories on resource mobilization and dependency (McCarthy & 
Zald, 1977; Staggenborg, 1988) leave out questions about the actual identities of leaders 
and participants and whether these affect critical movement outcomes. In developing a 
hypothesis for this project, I felt it important to pay attention to how the social position of 
the individuals who comprise an SMO affect framing processes. Within the immigrant 
rights movement, one can easily observe a wide variety of social and demographic 
differences between leaders, such as age, class, migration status, education level, and 
ethnic background. It is important to now review what scholars have theorized about how 
these factors impact social movement activity so that my analysis can adequately assess 
how they affect framing processes in the immigrant rights movement. These questions 
are integral to understanding the character of the movement, as they will reveal if there 
are major discrepancies between how different social groups interpret and address the 
issue of immigration rights.  
The Impact of Class 
 Unsurprisingly, class may have a strong effect on movements and movement-
building. Some foundational work on the relationship between class and social 
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movements comes from Rose (1997) who argued that social class “orders consciousness 
and shapes the interpretation of interests,” which has strong effects on political and 
organizational behavior (p. 461). While he notes that classes are not inherently moderate 
or radical and does not want to overstate the effects of class, he criticizes other scholars 
for dismissing the significance of class in explaining behavior, idea formation, 
perceptions, and priorities. Rose defines class culture as “beliefs, attitudes and 
understandings, symbols, social practices, and rituals throughout the life cycle that are 
characteristic of positions within the production process” (1997, p. 472). That is to say 
that each class is conditioned by a different authority arrangement inside the workplace. 
Additionally, each class’s beliefs and expectations are shaped by families, schools, and 
the media (i.e., structures outside of the workplace). Bourdieu (1984) calls this 
phenomenon class habitus: internalized forms of class condition and the conditioning that 
informs ideology and collective action.  
In sum, Rose asserts that working-class movements typically seek to resolve more 
immediate goals that have to do with the economic and social interests of its members; 
middle class-based movements strive toward ‘universal goods’ that are non-economic. In 
other words, “Middle-class movements have always framed their issues in moral terms, 
and working-class movements will continue to frame their issues in terms of interests” 
(Rose, 1997, p. 484).  A moral framing that has prevailed historically in the immigrant 
rights movements—especially since the 1990s—is the family separation frame. It 
employs emotional language of families being ripped apart because of detention or 
deportation, and intends to get its audience to understand this not as a political issue, but 
 44 
as a moral one where people are having their loved ones taken away from them. By 
contrast, a frame that employs interests would be the approach of the United Farm 
Workers Union in California during the 1960s and 70s. As immigrant farmworkers, they 
were essential to the state’s economy, but were being exploited by giant agriculture 
businesses. In their landmark strikes and consumer boycotts, their frame reflected a 
contest of interests between the fair wages and wellbeing for the farmworkers versus the 
growth of giant agribusiness and benefit of corporate elites. 
 To explain this difference in framing, Rose (1997) observes that “workers 
experience opposition to their wants and needs from the power of outside groups that 
control the system of rewards and punishments… In this power struggle, the working 
class achieves its interests through winning against the interests of others” (p. 479). These 
power relations and structures influence how working-class activists approach 
movement-building. They view change through the lens of interest competition and see 
outside groups as working for their own interests. These groups primarily appeal to 
interests in their framing since those who join these organizations are generally trying to 
improve some immediate condition. The United Farm Workers Movement is a strong 
example of immigrant-led organizing to improve immediate, material conditions—i.e., 
wages.  The interests that they were organizing against were the interests of big 
agribusinesses, who were benefitting by hundreds of millions of dollars per year at the 
expense of their farm labor (Holmes, 2010).  
Despite appealing primarily to interests, Rose notes that, “This distinction 
between the interests of people who are oppressed and of those who are exploiting, of 
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those who lack and those who wield power can only be made with reference to moral 
language” (1997, p. 480). Thus, while these groups attempt to appeal to (legitimate) 
material interests, they still employ moral language to highlight the injustices of certain 
power relations. The United Farm Workers Union certainly highlighted the exploitation 
by corporations that led to them needing to struggle for improved wages and 
unionization. However, in pushing for improvement of their working conditions, their 
framing certainly made moral claims about what justice and fairness should look like in 
the relationship between employers and employees.  
 Ginwright (2002) describes the working class framing that Rose discusses as a 
materialist frame. This frame is rooted in material conditions, such as low wages and 
high rent, and focuses on changing concrete, immediate conditions (Ginwright, 2002). 
These frames establish power relations that understand those outside of the working class 
to be in control of resources, rewards and punishments, and understand inequality as a 
result of misuse of power. In this framework, “struggles over power, resources, and 
access are common themes” (Ginwright, 2002, p. 550).  
 On the other hand, Rose argues that middle class social movement goals reflect a 
desire for a fair and orderly world in which clear standards for reward and punishment 
exist (1997). Rather than understanding the barriers to change as opposing powerful 
groups, they are more concerned with values, norms, and understandings. Middle-class 
individuals join SMOs to advance their ideas, skills, and beliefs, either to advance their 
careers or affirm their identities (Rose, 1997). The middle class does not antagonize the 
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bureaucracy in the same way that the working class does: the bureaucracy is far more 
accessible and benign to middle class interests.  
Ginwright (2002) describes this as a culturalist framing: the goal is to challenge 
ideas and values, not groups of people with power. According to Ginwright, “Through a 
shared set of ideas and values, culturalist frames focus on symbolic meaning and abstract 
theories of the social world and attempt to change social meaning and personal identity” 
(2002, p. 550).  This middle-class based framing encourages expertise-based change, and 
challenges “authoritarian control” over social and cultural meaning (Ginwright, 2002).  
As an example of how this framing could play out, certain SMOs in the immigrant rights 
sector focus their activism on being staunchly anti-ICE. One of the case study groups for 
this paper would fall into this camp, and bridges their fight with the broader movement 
against prisons in the U.S. In many ways, this group is mostly concerned with changing 
the dialogue around immigration to fit into a broader narrative of how the U.S 
criminalizes communities of color. They aim to change the narrative from a narrow focus 
on how immigrants are affected by criminalization to how many marginalized 
communities are harmed by the same systems. Their framing is much less concerned with 
improving a specific, immediate condition for immigrants, and more concerned with a 
narrative shift in how we understand immigrants as implicated in a larger, unjust system.  
These frames affect the way that individuals interpret community problems and 
create solutions to them. This class-based disparity is highlighted in Ginwright’s 2002 
study of ethnically homogenous grassroots organizations. While factors such as race, she 
observes, can foster solidarity among members of an SMO, these commonalities cannot 
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suppress the disparities in problem interpretation and conceptualization of community 
issues that arise from class differences. Her study calls attention to the effects of class in 
determining how problems are defined, interpreted, and addressed. In her case study, she 
observed the way that middle-class members of an organization would respond to certain 
issues in ways that obscured the concerns of the working-class members, and would 
privilege and legitimize culturalist framings over materialist ones (Ginwright, 2002).  
A 2014 book by Betsy Leondar-Wright builds upon this foundational work about 
class by exploring specifically how class affects movement-building. She suggests that 
class may have a stronger impact on the ability for people to build movements than was 
previously understood. She found that class colored how individuals framed issues in the 
context of movement meetings. For example, she notes, “In the movement for pay equity, 
middle-class feminists sometimes framed the issue differently than did unions” (Leondar-
Wright, 2014, p. 3). Within her analysis, she decided to categorize 362 meeting 
participants into four major class categories that she felt best captured them: lifelong-
working-class, lifelong-professional-range, upwardly mobile, and voluntarily 
downwardly mobile. The forefront assertion of this book is that: 
For a surprisingly large number of attitudes and behaviors, I found that class does 
predict how an activist may think or act, more so than race, age, or gender. The 
subtle interplay between how things are done in each movement tradition and the 
effects of individual members’ class predispositions paints a complex picture of 
why activists tend to think and act as they do. (Leondar-Wright, 2014, p. 4)  
 
Her book examines the role of class on movement traditions, recruitment and group 
cohesion, speech differences, antiracism frames, and responses to extreme behavior. 
These are all tasks and challenges commonly faced by movement leaders, and she urges 
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her readers to work to understand class-culture differences as a prerequisite to 
successfully building a mass movement. 
 One of her significant findings is that neither militant nor moderate political 
beliefs correlated with particular classes. Instead, she found that strains of moderate and 
radical were found in every class. While this supports Rose’s 1997 theory, it poses a 
challenge to some earlier theorists as well as to observations about the U.S. as a whole, in 
which working-class people tend to be more socially conservative and economically 
liberal, for example (Leondar-Wright, 2014, p. 63). Other dynamics that didn’t correlate 
with class include how formal or informal meetings were and how much time was spent 
in meetings talking about wider political issues (Leondar-Wright, 2014, p. 227). Leondar-
Wright suggests that class impacts these movement challenges and dynamics in two 
important ways. The first is that “a group is most likely to run into the troubles associated 
with the class conditioning of its founders and the majority of its members, the individual 
predispositions they bring into the group” (Leondar-Wright, 2014, p. 82). 
Simultaneously, a group will be affected by the class-based roots that are particular to 
that group’s movement tradition (ex: grassroots community organizing, professional 
advocacy, labor organizing etc.). Each group that she studied showed a strong correlation 
between the class background and current class of the members with a particular 
movement tradition. 
 Although this literature review will not capture all of her observations about how 
class specifically affects movement outcomes, I will briefly discuss some of her 
observations that may be relevant to a group’s framing strategies. In categorizing her 
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participants by class, Leondar-Wright weighs an individual’s higher education status and 
occupation a lot higher than other factors such as income because the former two carry 
much more social and cultural capital: “it changes what people know, who they know, 
how they talk, and their level of confidence about political participation—all relevant to 
activist involvement”  (Leondar-Wright, 2014, p. 33). This said, higher education alone 
may be relevant to how individuals frame issues.  
Leondar-Wright details a few general observations about the behaviors and 
tendencies of individuals from each class category in the context of organizational 
meetings. Most lifelong working-class individuals (which included many immigrants of 
color in her analysis) did not take up major roles or positions of power in their respective 
organizations, seeing themselves more as “worker bees” (Leondar-Wright, 2014, p. 41). 
Some viewed themselves as too inexperienced to play larger activist roles, and were 
described as disempowered. Others appeared to be preparing to take on larger roles, 
typically found actively listening and awaiting “marching orders” (Leondar-Wright, 
2014, p. 41). A smaller subset of lifelong working class activists did not fit into this more 
quiet archetype, whom she described as “powerhouse radical leaders” and who were all 
women (Leondar-Wright, 2014, p. 42). Importantly, Leondar-Wright notes that, 
“Solidarity, unity, and strength in numbers defined many working-class activists’ 
understandings of how social change happens… Thus, solidarity sometimes meant 
suppressing individual dissent in favor of standing together and backing leaders. 
Allowing political differences to divide the group was seen as foolish” (2014, p. 45).  
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Lifelong professionals, who tended to be U.S.-born and white in her sample, tended to 
speak with confidence and an air of authority which commanded the attention of other 
group members (Leondar-Wright, 2014, p. 48). She observes that their opinions typically 
prevailed, and they were seen as empowered and knowledgeable regardless of their prior 
experience.  
Straddlers, who are those who have dramatically risen in class since childhood, 
often played very strong roles in their groups and pushed “a moral certainty that they 
linked with their working-class backgrounds” (Leondar-Wright, 2014, p. 54). Many 
persistently called for their groups to remain true to their principles and values and often 
found themselves at the center of groups’ conflicts. The common thread connecting 
straddlers among the groups she analyzed is the centrality and strength of their 
ideologies. Some were gentle and others more assertive in pushing their ideologies, but 
most were fierce defenders of working-class members of their groups.   
Another interesting observation that is relevant to framing processes is what 
Leondar-Wright finds about the challenges that are faced by those in the “Professional-
Advocacy” movement tradition. She notes that because these groups are dependent on 
public and foundation funding, financial stakes are higher, and groups reported “turf 
wars” among member groups who are in competition for limited financial resources 
(Leondar-Wright, 2014, p. 72). Evocative of a resource mobilization dynamic, this 
observation calls into question the way that groups in the same umbrella movement relate 
to one another. In addition, she notes internal conflict over issues including whose frame 
would be used in a group’s public communications. These groups had high regard for 
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developing strong relationships with government officials and private funders—given 
their resource mobilization task—and the question of which frame to use for the group’s 
messaging could “make or break a member’s reputation” with those individuals and 
groups (Leondar-Wright, 2014, p. 72).  
Leondar-Wright takes on the explicit question of framing and class dynamics. In 
her analysis, she looks at how class impacts framing of racism, but her insights can 
certainly be extended to better understand the role of class in other framing processes. 
First, she emphasizes her profound findings about speech differences in groups as a clear-
cut class-cultural difference. She found that lifelong working class folks were more likely 
to reference specific people and places in their discourse (Leondar-Wright, 2014) and 
speak in a more action-oriented manner. By contrast, the professional middle-class 
groups used more abstract speech and less concrete referents (Leondar-Wright, 2014). 
Her example quotes reveal such activists often ‘tip-toeing’ around what they truly want to 
say and who they want to call out. These speech differences likely have an enormous 
impact on SMO framing processes, especially if the SMO at hand is comprised of a 
particular class majority. 
In her analysis of framing race, racism, and antiracism, she finds three pervasive 
frames among her groups: an institutional-racism frame (emphasizing white privilege 
and systemic subordination of communities of color), a multicultural diversity frame 
(placing blame on segregation, solution as diversity), and an anti-bigotry tolerance frame 
(emphasizing prejudice, discrimination, and hate and the need for tolerance and unity) 
(Leondar-Wright, 2014). While she saw each frame appear in every class group, there 
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were strong correlations with the rate at which each frame appeared in different class 
groups. The institutional racism frame was common among college-educated groups, and 
the anti-bigotry frame was most common among lifelong working-class folks. She 
hypothesizes that working-class groups may be drawn to the anti-bigotry frame because 
of a desire to perform respectability, or because it aligned with their overall social change 
strategies (Leondar-Wright, 2014). They did not disagree with the structural frame, but 
notice that it could be pushed in counterproductive ways, including the use of alienating 
jargon.  Once again, although this framework deals specifically with racism, it will be 
interesting to see if her observations about anti-bigotry versus structural factors holds up 
in relation to the immigrant rights movement.  
Leondar-Wright contributes a great deal to how this article analyzes class and its 
effect of framing processes in the immigrant rights movement. Although limited 
information was available with regard to the class background of leaders’ parents and 
family in my case studies, some inferences can be made from class-based characteristics, 
such higher education and other displays of cultural and social capital.  
Age and Migration: The Undocumented Student Movement 
 Examining the social position of movement leaders is particularly important in the 
immigrant rights movement because migration status affects one’s access to the 
institutions through which they can make claims and express grievances. Many 
immigrant rights organizations across the country are led and supported by individuals 
who do not hold citizenship in the U.S., which means they must operate outside of the 
legal or civic system to achieve their goals. This may greatly affect what demands groups 
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have and how they set out to achieve these changes. These questions have been explored 
to a great extent in literature related to the undocumented student movement in the United 
States. Not only do undocumented youth have a unique social position and relationship to 
the state and institutions, but they also bring forward the question of age and how it 
affects organizing outcomes. 
 Various authors have tried to describe the unique social position of undocumented 
youth, many of whom are DREAMers. Abrego (2011) theorizes about undocumented 
youth in contrast to undocumented adults. Whereas undocumented adults have mostly 
remained ‘in the shadows’ and are inhibited by fear to make claims, undocumented youth 
are much more actively making demands for access to opportunities in the U.S. and are 
more willing to organize (Abrego, 2011). There are various reasons that Abrego suggests 
may contribute to this difference, including the stage of life at which individuals arrived 
in the U.S. and the central social institutions which with each group interacts on a daily 
basis. These social institutions are where each group is developing their legal 
consciousness. Thus:  
“For undocumented firstgeneration immigrants whose daily lives are filled with 
stories about workplace raids and family separations, their fear of deportation can 
powerfully restrict them from making claims at work or anywhere they feel 
threatened. Undocumented 1.5generation youth, however, develop a legal 
consciousness based in stigma that is certainly a setback but can be overcome to 
make way for greater claimsmaking.” (Abrego, 2011, p. 354-355) 
 
Although undocumented youth still face stigma, many have been able to overcome this 
barrier, in contrast to undocumented adults who are still largely inactive in movements 
due to fear. Cabaniss (2019) calls attention to the fact that undocumented youth have 
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been educated about U.S. civics in schools, which distinguishes their engagement from 
that of their parents’ generation greatly.  
Negrón-Gonzales (2014) argues that undocumented youth must navigate and 
reconcile with “their juridical identities as undocumented migrants and their subjective 
identities as US-raised children” which has served as a catalyst for political mobilization 
of the populations she studied (p. 259). Their unique position as being legally prohibited 
from residing in the country they were raised in contributes to strong political 
mobilization among this subgroup which has its own very particular concerns and 
challenges. Seif (2011) adds that undocumented youth have a keen understanding of the 
fact that their life chances and those of their loved ones depend on social change, as they 
are rejected by the nation-state. These authors have drawn considerable attention to the 
tension between undocumented youth’s social and political identities and how this affects 
their movement engagement.  
 Given these observations about identity, other authors have suggested that youth 
activists are reframing the immigrant rights movement in various ways. One study by 
Cabaniss (2019) observes that undocumented students are reframing themselves as the 
rightful leaders of a movement that for too long has been dominated by adult citizen 
advocates. This involves both calling into question the legitimacy of adult citizens to 
speak on these issues and casting undocumented youth as the ones who deserve to lead 
the movement (Cabaniss, 2019). Cabaniss’ sample reported feeling invisible, silenced, 
and talked-down to by adult-led movements. They draw attention to the specific struggles 
they face due to their age. In addition, they express frustrations with adult citizens who 
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characterize the immigration problem as “broad, systemic, and indiscriminant in its 
impact” and make “no room for the special problems, concerns, and priorities of 
undocumented youth” (Cabaniss, 2019, p. 486). This literature suggests that in addition to 
the typical framing tasks of an SMO, undocumented youth leaders are tasked with 
asserting themselves as the rightful authorities in the conversation and standing up for 
their age group. For some groups, they choose to create their own groups, with new 
tactics and strategies, hoping to foster political empowerment for youth who haven’t felt 
welcomed in other spaces (Gordon, 2010). Many authors point to immigrant youth’s 
struggle in asserting political influence in more established social movement 
organizations who hold more social and reputational capital as well as economic support 
(Gordon, 2010; Nicholls, 2013; Taft & Gordon, 2013). Cabaniss details how the groups 
in her study used collective storytelling and character work to subvert the influence of 
adult citizen-advocates and fight against collective experiences of being disempowered 
and tokenized by groups led by adult citizens.  
 Apart from having to assert their deservingness against a movement dominated by 
adult citizen advocates, undocumented youth have also overwhelmingly mobilized 
against harmful frameworks of citizenship and belongingness. A variety of authors 
observe how youth activists have contributed to this reframing. This is one observation 
that seems to characterize this generation across the literature. Unzueta Carrasco and Seif 
(2014) note that undocumented youth increasingly fight for and defend people who fall 
outside of the nation-state’s traditional notions of citizenship. Undocumented youth are 
thus fighting for a broader framework, one which is not so focused on specific federal 
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legislation but more concerned about the rights of all immigrants to be present in the 
United States (Unzueta Carrasco & Seif, 2014). These activists understand traditional 
ideas of “good citizens” to be based in problematic assumptions based on race, gender, 
and class. They thus desire to redefine what constitutes ‘good citizenship’ to include 
those who “have limited access to education, work in the underground economy, are 
queer or are caught in the prison-industrial complex,” for example (Unzueta Carrasco & 
Seif, 2014, p. 296). 
Importantly, these activists note the wedge that can be driven between 
undocumented youth and their parents, skilled and other workers, and those with criminal 
histories versus those without them due to these narratives. They ultimately desire to rise 
above these divisive normative standards and affirm a more inclusive version of human 
rights. Abrams (2016) agrees that these activists reject respectability politics and offer a 
broader vision of justice for migrants. Abrams also observed this phenomenon as coupled 
with the embrace of more confrontational tactics to influence the government as well as 
more dramatic and emotional displays of resistance (2016). Activists have undertaken 
this change in strategies and tactics despite the risk of alienating conservatives who may 
question them for criticizing U.S. policy, or even more liberal allies, such as President 
Obama, who believed that he was supporting undocumented youth and may find the 
displays as excessive or ungrateful (Abrams, 2016).  This framing corresponds with the 
culturalist frame put forward by Rose (1997). It’s concerned with norms, values, and 
cultural understandings. While this could represent a generational shift in thinking, it 
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could also be a reproduction of the class-culture differences that Rose points to, given 
that many of these youth activists are students at universities.  
 Negrón-Gonzales (2014) writes about how undocumented youth have 
rearticulated what ‘safety’ means, such that undocumented youth sometimes feel safer 
upon disclosing their documentation status. They’ve achieved this through a number of 
successful mobilizations that have halted deportations though mass letter writing, call-ins, 
and petitions (Negrón-Gonzales, 2014). Enriquez and Saguy (2016) note a similar 
phenomenon that has occurred by groups harnessing the cultural schema of ‘coming out’ 
that was already present in LGBTQ+ movements. By creatively employing an already 
familiar concept with strong cultural meaning, movements activists were able to address 
movement participants’ fears about revealing status and increase social movement 
participation. 
 However, one author disagrees with the claim that youth activists are drastically 
reframing the movement, and instead observed that legal and normative ideas of 
citizenship were still very present in the campaigns that she studied (Patler, 2018). She 
notes that these ideas were especially present in campaigns that advocated on behalf of 
students, as movement activists portrayed them as high-achievers with a certain level of 
acculturation, civic engagement, and accomplishment. Patler argues that these qualities 
“reflect normative notions of deservingness built into immigration policies and 
prosecutorial discretion guidelines” (2018, p. 100). That is to say that these frames both 
shape and are shaped by ideas about membership and deservingness that are present in 
immigration laws, court decisions, and discretionary guidelines and programs (Patler, 
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2018). Importantly, Patler does note that these frameworks depend on the political 
moment: the campaigns that she studied all took place in the lead up to congressional 
action on the DREAM act. Thus, a group’s choice of frameworks may be influenced by 
the policy cycle and political opportunity, as discussed in the previous chapter. In 
addition, reversing an individual’s deportation should certainly be seen as a victory for 
the movement overall. However, it is a victory that looks very different compared to 
shifting normative understandings and structural changes, which have more permanent, 
lasting effects. Thus, not all victories of the movement should be weighted—or 
criticized—equally. Perhaps it’s not bad to use frames that are limited in their 
inclusiveness if they lead to victories for the movement.  
The student versus non-student framing disparity that Patler calls attention to is 
also present in the media coverage of anti-deportation cases led by undocumented 
activists. A study found that media outlets were more likely to give coverage to cases of 
undocumented students over non-students, suggesting that the media privileges those 
who align with broader understandings of citizenship and deservingness as they garner 
more public sympathy (Patler & Gonzales, 2015). The media helps push narratives such 
as citizenship as acculturation, citizenship as civic engagement, and deservingness vis-à-
vis victim status (Patler & Gonzales, 2015). By extension, media pushes forward a 
narrative that those who do not meet these criteria are not deserving of rights through 
selective media coverage. The reality of this disparity in media coverage may affect 
groups’ framing choices if they are trying to reach a broader audience.  
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This section provided an overview of much of the literature relating to undocumented 
youth mobilization in the United States. It calls attention to the particular challenges that 
they face due to their citizenship status as well as their age. It attempts to theorize about 
the impact of these factors on mobilization and strategies. Given that one of the eleven 
groups that this article explores through a case study is an undocumented youth-led 
organization, these questions and theoretical understandings will be important as I go 
about analyzing their framing strategies.  
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Chapter 4: A Brief History of the Immigrant Rights Movement 
 
 By taking even a preliminary look at scholarly literature that focuses on the 
immigrant rights movement it’s easy to deduce that the movement is quite new. When 
major social movement activity was taking place in the 1960s—providing the foundation 
for much of the social movement literature of the field—the share of immigrants in the 
United States was at its lowest point in the 20th century (Bloemraad et al., 2016). In many 
ways, as you will discover in this historical overview, a true social movement for 
immigrant rights—one that includes collective action, change-oriented goals, some 
temporal continuity and a degree of organization (D. Snow et al., 2004)—didn’t exist 
before the 1980s (Bloemraad et al., 2016). By contrast, in 2019, immigrants comprised 
13.6% of the U.S. population (Radford, 2019) and many scholars have agreed that a true 
social movement has arisen since the 1980s in favor of immigrant rights. The movement 
has certainly ebbed and flowed in terms of success and resonance with the broader U.S. 
population during this time period, and has focused on different fights at different points, 
such as the fight for legal presence versus immigrants’ access to benefits. The following 
chapter will provide an overview of the forms in which this movement has existed in 
recent U.S. history and conclude with thoughts about the contemporary challenges that it 
faces today. 
 From the 1850s until the 1960s, U.S. immigration policy was largely 
characterized by exclusion. Occurring alongside the heyday of European immigration to 
Ellis Island were a steady stream of laws that barred certain groups from entering the 
 61 
United States, starting with Chinese and Japanese immigrants, then barring virtually all 
Asians, and then excluding groups from Eastern and Southern Europe (Bloemraad & 
Voss, 2020). From the 1920s to the 1960s, the list of who could migrate was even stricter. 
There was some pro-immigrant sentiment from segments of the population during this 
period, including from some presidents, religious groups, business leaders (who were 
mostly concerned with labor supply) and labor unions, but there was certainly nothing 
close to a social movement emerging from these groups, especially compared to the 
women’s suffrage and labor movements that dominated the early 20th century (Bloemraad 
& Voss, 2020). 
 The 1960s through to the 1980s included some important precursors to what 
would later become the immigrant rights movement. These movements provided tactics, 
leadership, and inspiration to the future movement (Bloemraad & Voss, 2020). The 
Chicano civil rights movement of the 1960s is the first of these precursors, which 
encompasses labor organizing in California and student movements in the Southwestern 
United States. The broad goals of these movements were to “advance the livelihoods of 
agricultural workers, militate for the political and social inclusion of U.S.-born Mexican 
Americans, and improve the quality and inclusiveness of education” (Bloemraad & Voss, 
2020, p. 686). Although these movements made incredible advancements in their own 
right, they cannot necessarily be considered pro-immigrant social movements as they 
weren’t concerned with legal status or rights, but rather with the everyday concerns and 
aspirations of migrants living in America (Bloemraad & Voss, 2020).  
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The sanctuary movement of the 1980s—which focused greatly on helping Central 
Americans fleeing violence—is closer to an early manifestation of the movement given 
that it focused particularly on migrants (Bloemraad & Voss, 2020). As part of this 
movement, migrants provided public testimonials regarding human rights abuses they 
had faced to try to shift public policy and opinion. But by-and-large the most visible 
activists were white, middle-class Americans with no personal experiences of migration 
who were mobilized by churches and other groups (Bloemraad & Voss, 2020). One could 
argue that it was during this time that early notions of deservingness were being 
constructed. As the majority of migrants and refugees from Central America were feeling 
civil war, repression, and economic devastation (Gzesh, 2006), activists understandably 
pushed forward a narrative that emphasized asylum-seekers’ deservingness based on 
extraordinary conditions at home. However, in the context of increasing negative 
stereotypes about immigrants in the 1980s, activists constructed a “model immigrant” 
whose deservingness was based on humanitarian concerns and contrasted with someone 
migrating for economic reasons, for example (Yukich, 2013).  
 The 1980s were also a time of landmark court cases and legislation. Brought 
forward by the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund, Plyer vs. Doe guaranteed 
undocumented children access to K-12 public schools (Bloemraad & Voss, 2020) which 
undoubtedly expanded the realm of opportunity and institutional access that allowed for 
many migrants to have their voices heard. A few years later, the 1986 Immigration 
Reform and Control Act was passed. Although its primary goal was to restore control 
over heightened levels of unauthorized migration and penalize employers who knowingly 
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hired undocumented migrants, it also allowed for three million immigrants to legalize 
their status in the United States (Baker, 1997). This marked another step forward for 
infrastructure in place intended to serve migrants (Bloemraad & Voss, 2020).  
 The 1990s were characterized by a series of anti-immigrant legislative actions that 
further provoked collective action. Importantly, the 1990s highlight the interplay between 
federal and state laws that respectively made advances for and infringed upon the U.S. 
immigrant population. Bloemraad and Voss (2020) note that the U.S. federal government 
oftentimes makes the laws that govern legal status, while the rights and benefits that 
immigrants have access to are decided by state legislators. Proposition 187, approved by 
California voters in 1994, would have denied undocumented immigrants in California 
access to crucial social services including healthcare and public education. Although it 
ended up being declared as unconstitutional, it nonetheless sparked some of the largest 
protests and school walkouts since the Chicano movement, bringing 70,000 people out 
into the streets (Bloemraad & Voss, 2020). Two federal laws were passed in 1996 that 
restricted noncitizens’ access to social benefits, increased resources to border control, and 
strengthened the government’s power to deport noncitizens (Bloemraad & Voss, 2020). 
These laws marked the mobilization of various groups across the United States, including 
non-profit social service providers, local governments, legal clinics, and advocacy 
groups, who had some success in rolling back certain changes to public benefit access, 
but were largely unsuccessful against growing deportations and immigration enforcement 
(Bloemraad & Voss, 2020). 
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 The most well-documented uptick in immigrant rights activism—regarded by 
many scholars as the peak of the movement even to this day—were the 2006 protests that 
brought between 3.5 and 5 million people into the streets in protest (Voss & Bloemraad, 
2011). The bill they were protesting would have involved a substantial investment in 
border security, greater cooperation between the department of Homeland Security and 
local law enforcement, the criminalization of living in the United States without valid 
documents, and criminalization of those who assist unauthorized residents (Bloemraad & 
Voss, 2020). This marked an increase by adversaries in characterizing immigrants not as 
unauthorized or undocumented, but ‘illegal,’ increasing policymakers’ perceptions of 
immigration as an issue of law and order (Navarre, 2013). Not only did this mobilize 
immigrant advocacy groups, unions, and religious networks, but it mobilized 
unprecedented numbers of otherwise uninvolved folks. It is during this time that 
legalization became a primary goal of immigrant rights activism, rather than benefits 
(Bloemraad et al., 2016). Sassen (2006) argues that claims-making in the 2006 protests is 
best understood through a human rights frame, evidenced through pervasive slogans like 
“No human being is illegal,” which appeal to universal human rights values (Bloemraad 
et al., 2016). 
Various scholars think about the immigrant rights movement through a ‘pre- and 
post-2006’ lens and have theorized about what these large-scale demonstrations have 
meant for the movement since they occurred. Nicholls, Uitermark, and van Haperen 
(2020) observe the development of a “sophisticated, durable, and national infrastructure” 
of pro-immigrant advocacy groups since 2006 (p. 723). While the early days of the 
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movement were characterized by coalitions of unions, churches, schools, and civic 
associations, 2006 led to ‘scaling up’ to national pro-immigrant groups. These 
professionalized groups have enabled pro-immigrant advocates to have more access to 
the ‘center’ of national politics, speak with a common discursive voice, and attain greater 
financial resources (Nicholls et al., 2020). However, they note that such 
professionalization has also resulted in internal ruptures in the movement, especially 
between grassroots groups who prefer disruptive tactics coming into conflict with 
national leaders who prioritize maintaining access to institutions  (Nicholls et al., 2020). 
Although this is a pattern for many social movements, this may be even more detrimental 
for the pro-immigrant movement because “the fault lines between national and grassroots 
leaders tend to overlay distinctions between activists with legal status or citizenship and 
those without it” (Bloemraad & Voss, 2020).  
Many scholars echo Bloemraad and Voss (2020) in understanding the decade and 
half following 2006 to largely consist of reactive mobilization and many disappointments 
for the movement. However, there are some structural changes that occurred post-2006. 
For one, there has been a lot more high-profile engagement and protest from 
undocumented migrants and the children of deported parents (Bloemraad et al., 2016). 
Largely until 2010, these groups were focused on passing a DREAM Act but were at first 
unsuccessful. Scholars note that after 2010, many groups became more radical and 
adopted a more intersectional framework that understood their identities at tied to 
multiple forms of oppression (Nicholls, 2013; Terriquez et al., 2018). In response to 
feeling ignored by federal policy, DREAMers and young allies began to adopt more 
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confrontational and dramatic direct-action tactics, such as hunger strikes, rallies, sit-ins in 
the offices of public officials, and laying in front of buses driving migrants out of 
detention centers (Bloemraad & Voss, 2020). They also employed social media to 
encourage calling representatives and writing letters to halt deportations (Patler, 2018). 
These early demonstrations were successful in getting the Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals program passed in 2012 by the Obama administration. Although this was a 
major victory, former President Obama also oversaw hundreds of thousands of 
deportations during his time in office (Voss et al., 2020). The 2010 Affordable Care Act 
excluded undocumented immigrants and was followed by various state and local laws 
that also excluded them (Voss et al., 2020). This speaks to the deep disagreement that 
exists among American politicians and voters about the rights, benefits, and protections 
that unauthorized migrants should be entitled to. 
Contemporary Challenges and Recent Studies 
 The election of current President Donald Trump has fueled even more anti-
immigrant rhetoric and policy on a federal level. Although it has not been studied as 
heavily in the scholarly literature because the election is still quite recent, his anti-
immigrant policies and their reactions are well-documented in news media. During his 
first two months in office, Trump signed executive orders that denied entry into the 
United States—even for nationals—from seven Muslim-majority countries and 
temporarily suspended all refugee admissions (Boghani, 2019). He ended Temporary 
Protected Status in September 2017 which had protected individuals from a variety of 
countries who could not return home due to violence or conflict, and has taken various 
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measures to reduce the flow of asylum seekers into the United States. One of the most 
widely-criticized measures that has been taken by the administration are family 
separation and “zero tolerance” policies that began in the spring of 2018. In addition, the 
Justice department has threatened to withhold federal funds for law enforcement for 
sanctuary cities and states (Bloemraad & Voss, 2020). Most recently, he attempted to 
institute a public charge rule, which despite being blocked by federal judges, caused 
many immigrants to avoid enrolling in crucial public benefits. A theme throughout this 
administration is the switch from targeting immigrants with criminal histories—which 
was the case in the Obama administration—to targeting all immigrants (Bloemraad & 
Voss, 2020). What prevails throughout all of these policies is the constant fear and 
uncertainty that he has induced in immigrant communities in the United States 
(Goodman, 2017). Bloemraad and Voss (2020) note that repression in the form of nativist 
counter-mobilization is a powerful force in the Trump administration.  
 Although the majority of literature has not systematically analyzed changes in the 
movement under the Trump administration, some recent studies have looked at current 
framing processes employed by the movement to achieve their goals. Bloemraad et. al 
(2016) observe a framing contest that centers on three domains: rights, economics, and 
family. The rights frame breaks down into two separate forms of rights: civil and human 
rights. While civil rights are awarded based on nationality, a human rights framing 
appeals to rights based on human dignity and equality regardless of birthplace 
(Bloemraad et al., 2016). The human rights frame is present in recent protests which 
employ the phrase “No human being is illegal” (Bloemraad et al., 2016). The economic 
 68 
frame highlights the economic contributions of immigrants and feeds into notions of the 
‘good’ American (Bloemraad et al., 2016). Various boycotts and labor strikes that have 
tried to highlight the centrality of immigrant labor in the U.S. are employing such a frame 
by accentuating membership as workers and consumers (Bloemraad et al., 2016). Finally, 
Bloemraad et al. (2016) observe a family frame that became widely used starting with 
anti-deportation activism in the 1990s. It employs emotional language of families being 
ripped apart and casts immigrants as parents and family members, irrespective of their 
citizenship. Many link this frame with American values (Bloemraad et al., 2016).  
In their 2016 study that asked which of these frames is most resonant and for 
whom, they concluded that political ideology had a great effect on which of these frames 
would be most effective (Bloemraad et al.). They found that the family framing was more 
likely to move political conservatives toward greater acceptance of immigrants’ presence 
in the U.S. (Bloemraad et al. describe this as acceptance of “legalization”), but did not do 
much to sway their opinions of immigrants’ deserved access to benefits. They also find 
that appeals to human rights did not expand their sample’s notions of membership and 
deservingness (Bloemraad et al., 2016). A significant finding of this study is that 
“alternative framings resonate with—at best—one political subgroup and, dauntingly, 
frames that resonate with one group sometimes alienate others” (Bloemraad et al., 2016, 
p. 1647), which speaks to a the challenges of SMOs in the immigrant rights movement in 
trying to figure out which language will be most effective for making claims.  
 Bloemraad and Voss (2020) examined patterns in framing and collective identity 
in the immigrant rights movement and found that “During the Obama administration, 
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activists crafted a new frame highlighting the Americanness and deservingness of young 
undocumented Dreamers, a discourse that resonated with political leaders and in public 
opinion” (p. 695). However, this framing notably can stigmatize others who fall outside 
of these deservingness narratives, including Dreamers’ own parents. Some of the 
challenges of the movement today come from responding to the changing frames of 
opponents of immigrant rights. Bloemraad et al. (2016) observe that opponents have 
shifted from portraying immigrants as drains on public services to portraying them as 
criminals and even terrorists. While activists can respond to this framing by portraying 
immigrants as law-abiding citizens—as they often do—the more inclusive narrative that 
many groups have adopted today actually sees this response as driving an even deeper 
wedge between immigrants with criminal backgrounds and those without.  
 This paper seeks to examine the framing processes employed by SMOs in the 
immigrant rights movement in a city in the northeast United States. Given that the 
immigrant rights movement is largely understudied and there has not been much 
literature that attends to the movement’s status after the election of Trump, this paper 
expects to bring a host of new insights to the literature. This paper is the first of its kind 
in comparatively examining framing strategies by SMOs in the movement and hopes to 
reveal how these processes are affected by factors such as mobilizing resources, political 
opportunity structure, and the social position of organizers. In the following chapter, I 
will describe my methodology for choosing groups for these case studies and detail how I 
qualitatively coded various forms of discourse to produce my analysis.  
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Chapter 5: Data and Methods 
 Immigration policy and the immigrant rights movement have undoubtedly taken a 
forefront spot in the national dialogue and media in this contemporary moment. Our 
current President, Donald Trump, campaigned on a staunchly anti-immigrant platform 
where he promised to build a wall between the U.S. and Mexico. His presidency is 
largely characterized by anti-immigrant policies and there has been a large wave of 
immigrant rights mobilizing in response. The debate surrounding immigration is 
undoubtedly one of the most talked-about issues in the media in the last four years 
(although most news coverage at the time of releasing this paper has transitioned almost 
exclusively to coverage about the emerging COVID-19 crisis). Furthermore, the 
disagreements about immigration policy that exist even within parties became extremely 
apparent in the 2020 Presidential race. The wide range of ideas about how to reform 
immigration policy reflected among the Democratic candidates raises important questions 
about where America stands on how our borders should look and operate. This project 
evolved out of a desire to better understand where those who have felt compelled to 
organize around the issue of immigration stand on where America should be headed. 
Exploring their framing strategies appealed to me as a comprehensive way of comparing 
and contrasting how different groups interpret the current moment and how to proceed. 
 The data for this article is based on case studies of eleven immigrant rights 
organizations that operate in the metro area of a city in the Northeast United States. 
Although this was a convenience sampling based on my geographical location, they 
nonetheless represent a diverse sampling of different types of immigrant rights 
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organizations with differing priorities and strategies. A case study is an appropriate 
approach for this research question because it seeks to explore ‘why’ or ‘how’ something 
occurs (i.e., how groups develop framing strategies) and it is describing a contemporary 
phenomenon. These are two of the qualifications that Yin offers in his description of 
when a case study approach is useful (2009). I will be employing a multiple case study 
approach to address my research question because I am interested in understanding the 
field of immigrant rights organizing, not just one particular organization. 
Each of the eleven groups were chosen because they either focus on organizing or 
advocacy for the purpose of advancing rights of immigrants in the U.S. Some of these 
organizations are primarily direct-service organizations which also have an advocacy 
component to their work. I included any groups that self-identified advocacy as one of 
their organization’s main focuses. Organizations that only provide direct service for 
immigrant communities were excluded from this analysis. I identified the groups by 
searching on the internet, social media, and using databases that list non-profit 
organizations in the area. Once the existing groups were identified, I used all public 
media put forward by these groups to begin collecting data. This media included their 
websites, social media pages, videos, and news interviews as available. I also conducted 
in-person or virtual semi-structured interviews with four leaders of three of these 
organizations to gather more firsthand data about framing processes and some of the 
outcomes I was interested in understanding. Each interview lasted from 30-45 minutes 
and were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim. All of the names of organizations and 
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names of interviewees were given pseudonyms during the transcription phase to protect 
the identities of participants.  
The data from the organizations was qualitatively coded for various factors that 
this study takes interest in. The conceptual distinctions used by Staggenborg (1988) to 
characterize organizations and types of leadership were used to code my case 
organizations. The data was also coded for a variety of other factors, which are laid out in 
the data table in Appendix 1. My analysis was guided by the principles of grounded 
theory (Charmaz, 2006; Chun Tie et al., 2019; Glaser, 1967). This approach entails a 
constant comparative method between initial and new codes, continuously refining my 
relevant concepts and categories, to aid in the process of arriving inductively at a final 
theory. The overall process involved data collection, constant comparative analysis, 
memo writing (analytic notes about the data and connections between categories), 
coding, selecting core categories, and theoretical coding (Chun Tie et al., 2019). This 
said, there were many ‘layers’ of data collection and coding—while my collection began 
with scraping websites and other secondary sources of each SMO, I continuously kept 
pulling relevant information out of the data and placing it in the context of the theories I 
was considering. My theoretical codes were based on each of the theories that I presented 
in my literature review. For example, when a group’s framing strategies appeared to be 
impacted by resource dependency, I would code that data as such. I also looked at my 
data through the lens of “front-stage” versus “backstage” framing, which encourages me 
to consider who the intended audience of any given piece of discourse is (Goffman, 
1959). 
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Analyzing the data was aligned with the approach of discourse analysis (Johnston, 1995; 
Melucci, 1995). Discourse is defined as “the summation of symbolic interchange, of what 
is being talked and written about, of the interrelations of symbols and their systematic 
occurrence,” which can refer to documents, spoken words, and interactions that can be 
audiotaped or video recorded (Johnston, 1995, p. 218). It also includes knowledge of who 
is doing the talking, what is their social location, and to whom are they writing. Discourse 
analysis aims to reconstruct the mental structures of interpretation of movement 
participants, moving from the text to the frame (Johnston, 1995). Discourse is expected to 
reflect concepts such as frame bridging, frame alignment, frame extension, and other 
strategies and helps the analyst to understand why participants and social movement 
organizations act the way they do. 
Limitations 
 Building off of Melucci and Johnston’s writings about the utility of discourse 
analysis to understand framing processes, it’s also important to remember that these texts 
are being taken as self-apparent reflections of the organization and their strategy. Because 
it is rare that information about who composed the text is provided, it’s important to 
recognize that there could be subtle differences between individual leaders’ frames and 
this may be reflected in the discourse with no way to distinguish different voices 
(Johnston, 1995). Johnston notes that “speech or writing is produced from within a role 
perspective; and, second, role perspectives frequently change in the course of textual 
production, with commensurate changes in what gets said, and often subtle changes in 
what is meant” (1995, p. 224). In discourse analysis, it is important to try to recognize the 
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intention behind creating each piece of discourse, especially pausing to ask who is the 
intended audience.  
Importantly, as Melucci (1995) suggests, researchers must acknowledge the 
potential influence that they have on the participants’ answers (especially in interview 
data). The presence of an outsider creates an ‘artificial situation’ and analyzing data 
produced in this scenario requires a great degree of self-reflexivity to understand the 
potential impact of one’s identity (Melucci, 1995). In the context of my study, leaders of 
the organizations may certainly have felt a pressure to present the ‘positive’ aspects of 
their SMO while shying away from sharing more vulnerable information on certain 
organizational dynamics. As I was interested in understanding the field of SMOs in the 
area, I recognize that interview participants could have been less likely to criticize other 
organizations, despite understanding that this data would be anonymized. Although I 
would characterize my interview participants as having been relatively open about their 
experiences as SMO leaders, a more effective way to understand internal SMO dynamics 
could have been to observe meetings so that I could draw my own conclusions about the 
structure and culture of each organization. 
 In a more practical vein, my data was limited to what was made available online 
by the movement organizations. While some organizations are incredibly active on social 
media and have robust websites, others have very limited information available online. 
Although the interview data was extremely helpful in better understanding framing 
processes for the organizations I was able to get in touch with, my interviews represent a 
very small sample of the leaders of all the case organizations. Due to these two factors, I 
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was able to gather much more information on certain organizations than others. In 
addition, although discourse analysis is extremely useful for understanding framing 
strategies, my case studies could have benefitted from additional interviews and 
ethnographic observation, if conditions had permitted. Interviews and secondary sources 
represent just two pieces of a larger puzzle of an organization’s framing strategies. While 
I cannot draw strong conclusions about conflict and tensions within each SMO, my data 
allows me to address questions of field composition and formal social movement frames.  
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Chapter 6: Findings 
 The findings that I present in this chapter are situated in a very unique political 
moment. With the 2016 election of Donald Trump, there has certainly been a shift in how 
immigrant rights groups are received. President Trump’s anti-immigration rhetoric and 
policies pulled immigration far further into the arena of hot-button political and social 
issues. This has undoubtedly changed the resource environment for immigrant rights 
groups: they now have more legitimacy in the eyes of the general public in America 
(among those who do not support Trump), have attracted increased material resources, 
and have had to adapt to a growing anti-immigrant countermovement. These have all 
undoubtedly affected the way each group goes about mobilizing adherents, and has even 
spurred the existence of new SMOs. With the 2020 presidential election in sight at the 
time of this writing, it is unclear how this resource environment may shift once again. If 
President Trump is re-elected, the movement may face even harsher repression and an 
even more vitalized countermovement to repress them. But as I will suggest in the data 
analysis below, increased repression may strengthen these groups further and lead to 
increased mobilization. However, the other major possibility is the election of Joe Biden, 
who promises to unravel harmful Trump-era policies, but will stop short of more 
progressive reforms. For many Democrats in this country, his election may seem to signal 
an end to the anti-immigrant threat and thus decrease the availability of resources to 
immigrant rights organizations who will undoubtedly continue fighting for long-term 
reforms and the upholding of campaign promises. This is thus a pivotal moment for 
immigrant rights groups who need to ensure that their framing not only resonates in a 
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new political reality, but that it actually continues to drive people to action. I will observe 
how social movement organizations attempt to rally continued support in the face of 
changing political and cultural opportunities.  
A Brief Summary of the Literature Review 
 Before diving into the analysis of my case study groups, it’s useful to briefly 
reiterate what scholars expect to find. To summarize what was presented in the literature 
review of this paper, Benford and Snow—pioneers of the study of framing processes in 
social movements—bring attention to the political and cultural opportunity structure 
within which a movement is operating. They discuss how this can motivate or repress 
action and provide certain niche opportunities to make claims. It determines how 
receptive audiences might be to the goals of the SMO. Benford and Snow (1992, 1998, 
2000) also ask how central the beliefs at hand are to the adherent pool. They pay attention 
to cycles of protest and look at whether a given frame was used toward the beginning of a 
movement or later in the protest cycle, once an accepted ‘master frame’ had already been 
developed. McCarthy and Zald (1977) are most concerned with the external resource 
environment of SMOs—money, legitimacy, facilities, labor, etc. Due to the need to 
mobilize resources in a competitive environment, groups may adjust their framing 
strategies for a number of related purposes: appealing to conscience constituents, 
transforming bystanders into sympathizers, or converting adherents into constituents. 
Groups may also have to adapt to being resource-poor or marginalized from centers of 
power, which could lead to coalition work or strategies that draw from unique sources of 
legitimacy.  
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 The professionalization of an SMO is a large part of the literature I presented. 
McCarthy and Zald suggest that more funding leads to a greater desire to formalize a 
group’s leadership and structure, and that the role of membership will decrease upon 
formalization. The presence of money from large foundations or governments may cause 
groups to deny taking up the grievances of their base if they would challenge their 
funding structure. This may be coupled with a decline in direct-action or militant tactics, 
and a shift toward institutionalized tactics. Professionalized SMOs are expected to engage 
in successful coalition work and foster a stronger relationship with elites. Bartley (2007) 
claims that the presence of foundation support contributes to the building of a social 
movement field that carries with it one particular interpretation of the social world and a 
singular conception of appropriate action.  
 Scholars who focus on class, including Rose (1997) and Ginwright (2002) expect 
differences in framing between middle class and working-class activists. Middle class 
movement leaders are expected to frame things in terms of morals, values, and norms, 
while working class activists will frame things in terms of interests and fight for 
improvement of material conditions. These theories derive from the conditioning of the 
workplace of each class and how each experiences systems of reward and punishment. 
According to Leondar-Wright (2014), class-culture contributes to speech differences 
among individuals, such that middle-class individuals tend to speak with more abstract 
language while working-class groups use more concrete, specific language. SMOs are not 
only affected by the class-cultures of their founders and leaders, but of the historical class 
conditioning of their movement tradition. Leondar-Wright looks at antiracism frames in 
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her study, and finds that college-educated organizers were more likely to blame racism on 
structural factors such as white privilege and systematic subordination of communities of 
color, while working-class individuals in her study were more likely to place blame on 
bigotry and focus on a need for tolerance and unity.  
 Finally, I presented a variety of studies that theorized about the emerging 
undocumented youth movement in the U.S. which point to ways that both age and the 
unique legal and social position of undocumented youth may have a great effect on 
framing strategies. Abrego (2011) suggests that while undocumented youth have 
developed their legal consciousness in U.S. schools, adults are socially formed in the 
workplace, and youth are therefore not as constrained by fear as a barrier to making 
claims for themselves. With respect to age, Cabaniss (2019) argues that undocumented 
youth have felt sidelined by adult citizen advocates throughout the history of the 
movement, and are taking strides to assert themselves as the rightful leaders of this 
movement. Seif (2011), Cabaniss (2019), Negrón-Gonzales (2014), Unzueta-Carrasco 
and Seif (2014), and Abrams (2016) all discuss how undocumented youth have played a 
part in reframing the movement by adopting a more intersectional, inclusive approach 
and employing more dramatic, confrontational tactics.  
Findings 
 Appendix 1 includes a sizeable piece of the data I’ve collected on my case study 
organizations. To account for how professionalized each organization is, I include 
information about the type of organization they are, their leadership structure, and their 
funding sources. In this table, I’ve also included a blurb about each group’s strategy 
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which in many ways represents their prognostic framing. I collected data on whether the 
group is focused on advocating for migrants of a particular region or ethnic background 
and the primary languages that their discourse is produced in. The table also includes 
information about leaders’ education background, if available. Higher education is a 
strong indicator of class-culture differences between individuals, and is a stronger 
determinant of these differences than income or profession (Leondar-Wright, 2014). Not 
included in this table are the data that I coded with regard to each group’s diagnostic 
frame (who or what is to blame) and motivational frame (how they call people to action, 
how they justify their work).  
The Immigrant Rights Ecosystem 
 There are a few ways of understanding the immigrant rights environment in this 
Northeast U.S. city. The infographic below characterizes each organization by how much 
direct service versus advocacy that they engage in and whether they form part of a 
statewide coalition led by Legislative Action for Immigrants’ Rights (LAIR). The 
organizations to the left of the dotted line all form part of the LAIR coalition, which is a 
statewide, policy-focused organization that partners with over 130 member organizations 
who keep them abreast to challenges and developments on the ground, guide their policy 
agenda, and ensure that they consider a range of viewpoints.   
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The LAIR coalition holds a lot of legitimacy in the eyes of the state. The executive 
director has served on numerous committees and advisory boards to the federal and local 
government on immigration policy, including the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. They 
possess a high level of material resources and have the second-largest paid staff out of the 
case study organizations in this article (only behind the legal aid organization Northeast 
Legal Aid, which is also a member of the coalition). The major pieces of immigration-
related legislation that have been filed and have received widespread support over the last 
few years (primarily since 2016) have been spearheaded by LAIR, including a current bill 
that would bar local law enforcement from asking about someone’s immigration status 
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and would limit notifications to ICE. Some of the member organizations, such as 
Alcanzando las Estrellas, are part of the steering committees of such bills. LAIR attempts 
to bring together immigration advocates, faith communities, and allies to craft and 
campaign for support of these policies, which is how their member organizations are 
typically involved.  
 There are notably four immigrant rights organizations that are not members of this 
coalition, which include Partners for Just Borders, the Center for Education and Action, 
La Comisión de la Huelga, and Immigration Action Now. All of these groups fall into the 
category of informal organizations with a grassroots funding structure. All of these 
groups place less of an emphasis on changing public policies and more emphasis on 
grassroots organizing and building up the leadership capacity of immigrant organizers. 
Although it is not clear why exactly these groups do not take part in the coalition, it is 
clear that policy change is not their prognosis for the ills that they identify in the country 
with regard to immigrant rights. While these groups seem to acknowledge that legislative 
work is an important part of reducing harm right now, it seems that they are fighting for 
bigger, more structural shifts in how the immigration system operates. Riley, a core 
organizer for Partners for Just Borders reports feeling defeated and disillusioned by 
legislative work, as it does not address things holistically. She suggests, “The depth of 
change that's needed couldn't ever happen in a legislative cycle and it couldn't even 
happen… in our current political system,” which is why they’ve transitioned to a model 
of direct service that is characterized as ‘harm-reduction.’ Three out the four groups (the 
outlying group being the Center for Education and Action) that are not part of the LAIR 
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coalition actually collaborate frequently with one another. For example, Partners for Just 
Borders, while mainly a direct-service group for immigrants detained in ICE detention 
centers, partners with La Comisión de la Huelga and Immigration Action Now because 
those are both immigrant-led grassroots groups who use a similar political framework to 
them, according to Riley. Immigration Action Now mobilizes its youth base in support of 
the organizing strategy used by La Comisión de la Huelga, and the two groups frequently 
coordinate actions because they too report having a similar approach. The Center for 
Education and Action is the final group that is not a part of the LAIR coalition, and it is 
unclear if they actively partner with other groups.1 
 Importantly, many of the case study groups in this analysis describe themselves 
primarily as direct service providers but include advocacy as a priority. In the 
infographic, I’ve laid these organizations out on the Y-axis depending on to what extent 
they engage primarily in advocacy versus direct service work. For Northeast Legal Aid, 
Pathways Forward, and Immigration Services and Integration, their models prioritize 
direct service to immigrant communities and they choose to engage in advocacy when 
they come across issues that directly impact the populations they serve. Partners for Just 
Borders also prioritizes direct service but will only support mobilization if it can be 
directly tied back to directly-impacted folks, i.e. immigrants themselves.  
 Overall, there do not seem to be relationships of antagonism among the immigrant 
rights groups in this city, but rather there is caution on the part of the more radical groups 
                                                
1 The website for this group was under construction during the entire duration of this project, which 
limited the amount of data I was able to collect on them. 
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regarding who they are willing to work with based on whether they share certain aspects 
of their political framework. An important dynamic to note is the allocation of resources 
among these groups. LAIR seems to hold a strong plurality of material resources and 
legitimacy in the eyes of the state and even federal legislatures. While immigrants 
currently account for about half of LAIR’s staff, it is not an immigrant-founded 
organization. It certainly appears that LAIR has brought together a strong coalition that is 
representative of many immigrant-led groups making diverse claims, but what are the 
limits of making claims on others’ behalf? It is unclear how well-represented the 
community groups feel as part of this coalition, but this dynamic would be worth 
exploring in future research. 
Emerging Diagnostic Frames 
Three primary diagnostic frames emerged from the groups in my case study: the 
structural blame frame, individual biases frame, and the poor policies frame.  
The structural blame frame focuses on addressing and calling attention to the 
root causes of issues that affect immigration and immigrants. The two organizations that 
primarily embrace this frame are the Center for Education and Action and Partners for 
Just Borders. The Center for Education and Action dedicates a lot of attention to the root 
causes of forced migration and calls on the United States to reckon with its role in 
perpetuating structural violence specifically in Central America. They emphasize the 
harm caused by U.S. interventionism historically and presently and how it has supported 
oppressive military regimes. The Center for Education and Action actively criticizes 
harmful partnerships between the U.S. and Mexico that essentially extend the United 
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States’ security apparatus. This diagnostic framing is tinged with human rights frames as 
well, as this group emphasizes how these security practices violate international law and 
the human rights of immigrant communities. A different side of a similar structural blame 
frame is promoted by Partners for Just Borders, who focus their stances on oppressive 
systems sponsored by the state. Importantly, Partners for Just Borders uses frame 
bridging to connect immigrants’ struggles against militarization and hyper-surveillance to 
similar struggles faced by Muslim communities after 9/11, Black communities, and 
indigenous communities defending their land. Their blame frame suggests that immigrant 
communities have always been the subjects of militarized immigration enforcement, and 
that this is not new with the election of Trump. An extension of this frame includes 
seeing local law enforcement as actively aiding federal authorities in carrying out 
wrongful deportations, and thus complicit in this militarization. One of their foundational 
values is to judge the system, not the people, further calling attention to their view of the 
entire immigration and security apparatus of the U.S. as the biggest injustice to be 
toppled. Their use of the structural blame frame is also coupled with appeals to the 
human rights of immigrants, understanding immigration jails as dehumanizing and 
lacking basic human services.  
Despite having diagnostic frames that complement one another in many ways, 
these two groups have different prognostic frames. Partners for Just Borders is an 
organization in which leaders and volunteers are mostly allies (i.e. non-immigrants), but 
works closely with immigrant communities and immigrant-led organizations. Partners for 
Just Borders see their role as ‘harm-reduction’ in the context of an oppressive system that 
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over-criminalizes immigrants and isn’t likely to change anytime soon. Their goal is to 
mobilize resources to get immigrants released from ICE detention and thus allow 
immigrants themselves to initiate and participate in systems-change organizing. In the 
words of Jacob, a 24-year-old white male leader of this organization, “Even though we’re 
a direct service organization, we’re still rooting for systems-change.” They adopt a very 
strong anti-prison and anti-militarization framework and see themselves as a force to help 
politicize and radicalize non-immigrant volunteers who have otherwise not come into 
close contact with the harmful immigration system. However, as they are not immigrant-
led, they do not see it is as their responsibility to engage in systems-change organizing, 
but rather to follow the lead of immigrants who are.  
On the other hand, the Center for Education and Action—a grassroots-oriented 
group that is led primarily by Central American migrants—integrates community 
organizing with basic services and education and frequently takes up public actions such 
as staging protests in front of the Mexican Consulate to condemn the human rights abuses 
by the Mexican State at the order of the Trump administration. Additionally, they call 
upon white allies to use their privilege and take a proactive role in struggling toward a 
more “just and democratic society” and “demand that the US government focus its 
foreign policy on addressing root causes of migration.” While their main goal is to 
empower their members and allow them to share their stories, the Center for Education 
and Action understands that because they are operating with very few resources, they call 
upon allies to weaponize their power and privilege as a way to legitimize them in the eyes 
of the government.  
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The next diagnostic frame that I found is an individual biases frame, which tends 
to emphasize factors like hate, prejudice, and racism as the locus of blame, and focuses 
on the need for greater understanding and empathy as the solution. Alcanzando las 
Estrellas uses a lot of language that calls attention to such factors, putting blame on ‘the 
spirit of racism,’ xenophobic arguments by legislators, negative rhetoric, lies, and hate. 
Their approach and prognostic framing extends pretty clearly from this understanding of 
the root causes of anti-immigrant sentiment in the U.S. They focus on trying to 
emphasize the positive contributions that immigrants have made to the U.S., because they 
believe that many lawmakers do not have exposure to the real stories of immigrants. 
They want to ‘take control of the narrative’ and present their contributions to this society, 
which they do through social media and outreach to share testimonies on how immigrants 
contribute and strengthen the U.S.  
The Latinx Leadership Council, Immigration Services and Integration, and 
Pathways forward all employ similar framing language that is notably broader than most 
of the other groups in my study, and includes combatting racism, xenophobia, and ‘all the 
isms,’ as the Latinx Leadership Council puts it. Each organization uses vague language 
and desires to work toward goals such as fair treatment and allowing immigrants to 
successfully take advantage of what the U.S. has to offer. Although the language used is 
not super specific, these groups tend to focus on the need to eradicate the individual 
biases and prejudices that make the U.S. an inhospitable place for immigrants. Rather 
than combatting ‘the –isms’ on a structural level, these groups are more focused on 
dispelling negative stereotypes and shifting biases. The Workers’ Alliance for 
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Immigration Rights partially employs this frame, as they call attention to the way that 
abuse and exploitation toward immigrant workers can be partly blamed on racism and 
racialization due to language and cultural differences. However, they more frequently 
employ a policy change approach.  
What is common among the groups that identify the need to target individual 
biases is that they all use some elements of direct service—such as legal assistance, 
citizenship classes, language classes, civic engagement and leadership development—as 
tools to push for greater acceptance of immigrants in the United States. Rather than 
pushing against the barriers that the state puts on immigrants, they employ a direct 
service model that tries to build up the legitimacy of immigrants in the view of the state 
and other institutions and then pushes for their voices to be heard. In contrast to groups 
actively trying to change systems that repress the opportunities of immigrants, they 
concern themselves more with attending to the immediate legal and social needs of 
immigrants and then trying to give them a platform to shift harmful anti-immigrant 
narratives. 
The final diagnostic frame that emerged from the groups in my case studies is 
quite straightforward: the poor policies frame. These are groups who generally argue 
that the plight of immigrants in the U.S. boils down to bad policies that don’t address 
their needs. It differs from those who are calling for structural change because it accepts 
the legislative and electoral system as they are and believes that with the right legislation 
in place this country will be able to be more welcoming for immigrants. The two groups 
that are best described with this framework are the LAIR Coalition and Northeast Legal 
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Aid. The LAIR Coalition is highly-professionalized and its main priorities are pushing 
for legislation to protect or extend the rights of immigrants in the United States. 
Northeast Legal Aid is primarily a legal aid organization that provides free legal 
assistance to immigrants but also engages in impact litigation and some lobbying when 
they become aware of ‘holes in the system’ that affect their clients. These groups employ 
more of a step by-step approach to making change in the immigrant rights sector through 
close contact with institutions that make the rules.  
Immigration Action Now somewhat employs a poor policies blame frame, but it 
is more pointed toward antagonizing and defeating Donald Trump. While Trump’s name 
acts somewhat as a stand-in for anti-immigrant sentiment overall, this group tends to 
focus on how his policies and platform are attacking immigrants and have emboldened 
other anti-immigrant forces. However, their response does not focus squarely on policy 
change, but in standing in solidarity with all communities who are excluded from Donald 
Trump’s vision for the world and engaging together in nonviolent civil resistance. As 
seen from these three groups, a poor policies frame does not only lead to one type of 
prognostic frame.  
The only SMO that I have not categorized into either of these three frames is La 
Comisión de La Huelga. While it somewhat sits between the poor policies and individual 
biases frame, it has a very specific blame frame that stems from its frustrations with a 
lack of legislative progress. They frequently talk of broken promises by political parties, 
and argue that every year politicians battle for their votes but stall legislation that 
addresses their needs. They are an entirely “self-sustaining movement,” meaning that 
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they exclusively do grassroots funding, because they believe that if they receive “big 
money,” it’s because the funder(s) want to control their movement. Through a national 
strike of immigrant consumption and labor, they desire to shift the question from whether 
or not this nation wants immigrants (the very question that has led to such stalled 
progress) to the understanding that it needs immigrants. La Comisión has a very pointed, 
specific diagnostic and prognostic frame that is not taken up by any other groups. They 
specific blame politicians, political parties, and big funders for stalled progress for 
immigrant rights. Their prognostic frame follows from this logic and harnesses 
immigrants’ power as workers and consumers—a strong example of working ‘outside the 
system’ to make their demands. 
Emerging Motivational Frames 
 The next frames that I present are those which SMOs use to justify their approach 
and mobilize people to action. These capture ‘how the groups frame the issue of 
immigration.’ These frames capture how they think that their adherents, bystanders, and 
antagonists should interpret and think about issues around immigration. When addressing 
potential adherents, SMOs use these following frames to justify why someone should 
care about immigrants’ rights. These frames include: human rights, civil rights, economic 
contributions, the American Dream, and intersectional solidarity.  
 The first frame—human rights—is the frame that appears at the highest rate 
among all SMOs studied. It understands attacks on immigrants as attacks on inherent 
human rights and human dignity. What’s important about the human rights frame is that 
it transcends questions of national identity and citizenship, and attempts to get the 
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audience to empathize with immigrants’ inherent human dignity and rights to seek health, 
safety, and wellbeing. It often invokes international law and international human rights 
conventions to make more substantiated claims about what individuals and families are 
entitled to. SMOs that I studied use phrase such as, “We all have basic rights no matter 
where we were born,” “No human being is illegal,” and “The dignity of each human is 
the same regardless of skin color” to push forward a human rights framing. Whether to 
attract adherents or respond to antagonists, the human rights framing tries to get at 
something that’s universal. They want their audience to empathize with all of humanity.  
For some groups, including Alcanzando las Estrellas and Pathways Forward, the 
human rights frame is used primarily with reference to humanitarian policies such as 
Temporary Protected Status, a policy designed to allow individuals from countries with 
armed conflict or natural disasters to live and work in the U.S. for a set period of time. 
Groups also often reference DACA with language related to human rights and human 
dignity. Thus, it might be easier to make a human rights claim when the issue at hand 
invokes humanitarian concerns that induce more of a “moral shock” to adherents. 
  Human rights framing is not always explicit, but is sometimes implied. For 
example, Northeast Legal Aid prioritizes serving victims of violence, exploitation, 
trafficking, and other dangerous situations. While they would like to serve as many 
people as possible, they prioritize those “who are in the greatest need” according to 
Meredith, a staff attorney there. They thus prioritize clients in a way that mirrors how the 
U.S. prioritizes asylum-seekers, employing humanitarian ideals of offering refuge from 
violence as their prime concern (this is certainly more of an ideal than a reality, given the 
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years-long backlog of asylum applications). Northeast Legal Aid pushes a human rights-
related interpretation of immigration issues by prioritizing individuals who were faced 
with violent injustices that infringed on their human rights. Immigration Action Now, La 
Comisión de La Huelga, and Partners for Just Borders also employ human rights 
language frequently, calling upon immigrant communities’ inherent right to live a safe 
and dignified life and right to be protected. Partners for Just Borders criticizes ICE 
Detention Centers as violating peoples’ human rights due to their denial of “humane 
supports and access to basic services.” 
Other groups do not as frequently evoke a human rights framing, but focus on a 
civil rights frame. These differ because the civil rights frame focuses on what 
immigrants should be entitled to as people living in the United States. Civil rights are 
“embedded in a particular American set of institutions [the Constitution, judicial review] 
and an implicit appeal to a narrative of US citizenship” (Bloemraad et al., 2016, p. 1652). 
The three groups that employ this frame most frequently are the Latinx Leadership 
Council, Immigration Services and Integration, and the Workers’ Alliance for 
Immigration Rights. Their focus is on engaging immigrants in democratic processes and 
fighting for ideals such as equal political representation, a voice in public debates, and 
greater access to legal citizenship. Immigration Services and Integration does a lot of 
organizing around voter registration and voting. Rather than fighting for more rights to be 
extended to undocumented migrants, as some of the human rights-focused groups do, a 
civil rights frame stays more strictly within the bounds of the U.S. civic system. These 
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groups all prioritize addressing immigrants’ legal and citizenship needs as to allow 
immigrants to take advantage of what the U.S. has to offer and “lead productive lives.”  
The next frame was a heavy part of the response to rescinding DACA that I wrote 
about in the introduction to this thesis, and that is the economic contribution frame. 
This frame is used primarily by three groups: Alcanzando las Estrellas, LAIR, and La 
Comisión de La Huelga. When making their claims, Alcanzando las Estrellas emphasizes 
how immigrants have contributed to the U.S. through opening businesses and stimulating 
the economy. Language around these economic contributions are common throughout 
their discourse, and it is coupled with references to their “social, cultural, and spiritual” 
contributions as well. Given that Alcanzando las Estrellas is a faith-based organization 
that operates as a social ministry of a bilingual church, much of their discourse has 
underlying religious or theological references to how immigrants strengthen the U.S., 
including how they have contributed to building and sustaining places of worship.  
LAIR also frequently invokes an economic contributions frame. For example, 
among the factsheets available on their website that provide data about immigrants in the 
state, they provide a lot of data on how immigrants fit into the workforce, data around 
them being consumers and taxpayers, and overall trying to explain—through empirical 
data—that immigrants are essential the state and national economy. This framing comes 
up most frequently in factsheets and reports that may be used to present to legislators and 
other stakeholders, suggesting why they may be employing this frame to begin with.  
To some extent, La Comisión de la Huelga is also employing an economic frame 
in their long-term campaign for strikes and boycotts. These tactics specifically highlight 
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immigrant labor and consumption as integral to the economy in hopes that this will 
persuade legislators and the public to understand the centrality of immigrants. La 
Comisión is highlighting deservingness of membership based on immigrants’ status as 
workers and consumers. Notably, however, La Comisión is employing a direct-action 
approach to highlighting immigrants’ centrality in the economy, whereas the other groups 
use this fact more as a ‘talking point’ to persuade adversaries. In addition, the former 
groups highlight economic contributions to emphasize immigrants’ deservingness. La 
Comisión, however, employs economic tactics because they are a source of non-
institutional power to raise immigrants’ voices and then make demands. 
Deeply connected to the economic frame is the American dream and 
meritocracy frame. This is one which emphasizes certain characteristics of immigrants 
such as being hardworking, law-abiding, or accomplished to highlight their deservingness 
to remain in the United States. These qualities correspond with the ‘American Dream’ 
narrative—arrive with nothing, work hard, and prosper. The two groups which utilize this 
most extensively are Alcanzando las Estrellas and the LAIR Coalition—two of the same 
groups that highlighted economic contributions. In making the case that immigrants 
deserve a place in the U.S., Alcanzando las Estrellas emphasizes qualities such as good 
moral character, being hardworking, law-abiding, responsible, and being someone who 
has invested in the economy. In using this language, they are suggesting that 
deservingness can come from merit, or the possession of certain qualities. In the chapter 
on the history of the movement, I noted how activists who fought for the DREAM Act 
and fought against deportations of youth often used a similar frame; they would often 
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highlight the fact that the individual was a student, working hard, and had accomplished a 
lot. As I’ve discussed, this framing may be effective in convincing judges to rule against 
an individual’s deportation, or it might convince some antagonists to view certain 
immigrants more favorably, but there are notable limits to this frame’s inclusivity of all 
immigrants.  
The LAIR Coalition also invokes imagery and references to the American Dream 
narrative. They use a fair amount of American symbolism and imagery, including hosting 
a fundraiser called “Give Liberty a Hand” and citing Emma Lazarus’ poem from the 
statue of liberty to substantiate their call to “make America a land of hope and 
opportunity.” They explicitly reference the American dream in their discourse, suggesting 
that if immigrants are under attack, then the whole American dream is under attack. 
American symbolism and imagery was a trope used frequently by immigration rights 
activists earlier in the movement, especially around the 2006 protests. It may be useful in 
connecting with more conservative individuals who typically hold pride in the American 
Dream narrative and other symbols of freedom.  
The final frame actively rejects the last two frames I’ve described. The 
intersectional solidarity frame is most used by Immigration Action Now and Partners for 
Just Borders. This frame tries to undo any framing that is only inclusive of certain types 
of immigrants, such as the economic and meritocratic frames, and advocate for a frame 
that is more inclusive of those who aren’t typically considered ‘strategic.’ While other 
movement actors could highlight a picture-perfect, law-abiding citizen who has raised a 
family and started a business because these accomplishments and behavior would be 
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strategic in persuading an antagonist, the “new frame” takes notice of how these frames 
exclude many people. For Immigration Action Now, their embrace of this frame aligns 
greatly with what Seif (2011), Cabaniss (2019), Negrón-Gonzales (2014), Unzueta-
Carrasco and Seif (2014), and Abrams (2016) all hint at in their scholarship about how 
undocumented youth have reframed the movement. Immigration Action Now has been 
working to create a Queer Undocumented Project Team, a Women’s Collective, and an 
UndocuBlack team. Immigration Action Now wants to emphasize the fact that many 
people are multi-marginalized and believes that these communities must mobilize in 
solidarity to protect one another. They highlight that it’s not just immigrants who are 
under attack, but people of different religions, racial and ethnic groups, gender identities 
and expressions are all at risk under the Trump administration.  
Partners for Just Borders overtly criticizes frames that paint a ‘good immigrant’ 
versus ‘bad immigrant’ and attempts to actively unravel the conflation between 
immigrants and criminalization. They argue that criminal charges do not equal non-
deservingness, as some of the early frames would suggest. In stressing this point, they 
call for solidarity with other communities who have been the targets of criminalization, 
namely Black communities, Muslim communities, and Indigenous communities. What 
Partners for Just Borders and Immigration Action Now have in common is frame 
extension: that is, they present the issues that affect immigrants as inherently tied with 
other groups who are facing oppression and call for solidarity to build community power 
from the ground up. In the following chapter I will present my analysis on how groups 
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arrive at a particular frame and what factors seem most relevant in determining which 
frame an SMO will arrive at.  
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Chapter 7: Analysis 
 
 In this chapter, I will discuss what seemed to be the most relevant factors in 
determining why SMOs in my study arrive at a certain frame. In summary, there is 
evidence to suggest that the most relevant factors are resource mobilization (primarily in 
the form of dependency on foundations), professionalization, and political and cultural 
opportunity structure. In addition, the movement overall seems constrained by the 
“master frame” that was created by early movement activists. There is some evidence that 
confirms the effect of age as well, as the groups led by younger folks are more likely to 
adopt an intersectional solidarity frame. Finally, it does not seem that immigration status 
or ethnic background of the leaders alone impacts a group’s framing strategies, but some 
of the challenges that are unique to the social position of immigrants affects how they are 
able to mobilize resources. Class-culture differences in framing are also not confirmed by 
my data. There is no evidence to suggest that foundations are functioning as field-
builders among the movement organizations in this study, nor are grievances being 
manufactured by professional career activists.  
Cycles of Protest and Master Frames 
 Benford and Snow (1992) suggest that frames that emerge earlier in a cycle of 
protest actually function to color future movements, while frames that emerge later in 
cycles of protest are constrained by the pre-existing “master frame” and may not resonate 
as strongly with adherents. Overall, this seems to be relevant to the immigrant rights 
movement in the city I studied. Early on, immigrant rights organizations and 
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undocumented youth crafted a representation of young immigrants that rested on notions 
of ‘Americanness’ through American symbols and narratives of cultural assimilation and 
hard work. Nicholls argues that these themes formed the master frame from which groups 
have since drawn to assert rights claims in the public sphere (2014). It seems that this 
frame remains salient in many ways by the groups that I’ve studied, and only two groups 
actually reject this frame and are trying to create something more inclusive. 
 The SMOs that continue to utilize this master frame, which takes many forms, 
likely recognize it as strategic and successful. Indeed, this was the frame that made great 
advances for immigrants’ rights in 2006 and later in passing the historic DREAM Act. In 
trying to cope with an onslaught of anti-immigrant rhetoric and policies, it is not 
surprising that groups would choose to adopt aspects of a frame that has proven 
successful historically and emphasizes a type of immigrant that fits into America’s 
‘foundational values.’ They especially might be trying to appeal to a more conservative 
audience given the growing anti-immigrant countermovement. However, groups like 
Immigration Justice Now and Partners for Just Borders recognize the limits to these 
frames and show that they may have unintended long-term consequences on the narrative 
surrounding immigrants.  
Nonetheless, this master frame still remains pervasive among the groups I studied. 
While for some groups this frame is more overt, other groups simply have traces of its 
ideals, such as referencing being responsible citizens or making claims to deservingness 
based on having a family in the U.S. Overall, it seems that the movement is still largely 
adheres to this master frame, and very few SMOs are rejecting, challenging, or strongly 
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deviating from it. Given that the main groups that are challenging this narrative are youth 
and young adult-led, this could give us insight into where the movement is heading in the 
future. This younger generation on leaders is recognizing the effects and limits of frames 
and working to create a frame that’s more inclusive and far-reaching.  
The Prevalence of Resource Dependency and Professionalization 
 There is strong evidence that SMOs’ framing strategies are impacted by resource 
dependency and professionalization. These two factors are separate but intimately 
connected, as the resource mobilization approach to collective action is associated with 
formalized organizations. McCarthy and Zald (1977) argue that due to the availability of 
more funding for movement activists to make a career out of activism, SMOs are more 
likely to formalize their leadership and structure.  
The prevalence of resource dependency in my data set manifests itself in a few 
different ways. I’ll start by describing one of the most professionalized groups in this 
study: the LAIR Coalition. The LAIR Coalition is highly formalized, has a strong 
division of labor, and is well-funded. They have seventeen full-time paid staff and focus 
on policy analysis, legislative and administrative advocacy, and strategic 
communications. They also hold a high level of legitimacy in the eyes of the local and 
federal legislatures. LAIR’s framing focuses most heavily in the realm of the American 
Dream framing as well as economic contributions. Within their frames, they push 
forward strong relationships with institutions as well as local law enforcement. It is clear 
through their desire to maintain strong relationships with the government and other 
institutions that they try to maintain the legitimacy that has allowed them success in the 
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policy arena. As a result, they stray far from more radical assertions or anything that is 
too critical of current power structures.  
Through my interview data, it is clear that other SMOs in the area get the sense 
that this organization is constrained by these institutional relationships. Riley, an 
organizer with Partners for Just Borders, shared with me that the director of the LAIR 
Coalition suggested on a radio show that it is important to build relationship with local 
law enforcement when there are threats coming from the federal level (this was in the 
context of the Customs and Border Patrol Tactical Units—or SWAT teams—that were 
rumored to be coming to enforce mass deportations). Riley noted: “And sometimes I also 
know groups sort of have to because when they’re more formal and they have whatever 
their funding sources and whatever, different relationships, but what’s great about being a 
decentralized network is that we don’t have to play by those rules and we can say what 
we actually believe.” Another organizer with Partners for Just Borders echoed this 
sentiment, suggesting that LAIR doesn’t always say what they want to say. 
 In many ways, LAIR’s framing is strongly connected with the question of what 
might change a legislator’s mind. Whereas other groups are concerned with individual 
biases and prejudices that lead to discrimination at all levels, for example, LAIR is much 
more willing to adopt dominant assumptions in the pursuit of ‘practical’ institutional 
change. LAIR focuses much less on the individual level of hate and bias, and more on 
creating a frame that is going to resonate with people in power. Their framing is careful 
and calculated and does not use terminology that would be too polarizing. This evidence 
is strong because it provides a stark contrast to grassroots organizations in my study that 
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don’t seem to have the same constraints. Overall, the grassroots groups in my study are 
more willing to make “radical” or polarizing claims, including being more up front about 
the role of racism, white supremacy, and structural oppression. For example, the Center 
for Education and Action is entirely grassroots-funded and operates on relatively low 
resources. They are also very outspoken about U.S. interventionism and militarization as 
the root cause of forced migration. Their framing stands in strong resistance to the U.S. 
and they take a more aggressive, direct-action approach to their organizing. They are 
overall more ‘up front’ with their blame frame and are not actively trying to keep ties 
with government, but rather to antagonize it.  
 Another strong departure from the professionalized nature of the LAIR Coalition 
is Immigration Action Now, the youth-led collective fighting for liberation of the 
undocumented community. Interestingly, Immigration Action Now was created in 2005 
as a project of LAIR to campaign for greater access to higher education for 
undocumented youth. In 2008, Immigration Action Now stopped working under the 
umbrella of LAIR “to expand its student base” and transitioned to being an independent 
organization. What’s stark about this case is that their framing and organizational deeply 
departs from that of LAIR. They are entirely crowdfunded, adopt a “decentralized 
democratic participation model” that is not hierarchical, and their framing is much more 
radical and intersectional. Their organizing strategy uses civil disobedience and direct-
action tactics. While I will discuss the particular implications of age and social position a 
bit later in this chapter, it seems that their framing departs so strongly from that of LAIR 
because of their differing organizational structure and resource dependency. Immigration 
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Action Now uses liberationist, anti-establishment language that contrasts that of their 
former parent organization, who readily engages in institutionalized politics. The splitting 
off of these two organizations and their strong departure in framing speaks to the strong 
effect of resource dependency and professionalization on a group’s framing.  
 Northeast Legal aid is a legal services organization that provides free legal 
representation to immigrants in the metro area and employs impact litigation to affect 
public policies and landmark court decisions. While not as obvious as the case of the 
LAIR Coalition, Northeast Legal Aid largely uses framing that would appeal to an 
audience of policymakers, judges, and other stakeholders in shaping what our 
immigration landscape looks like. By and large, they use a human rights framing. Not 
only does this make sense as it corresponds with international law and norms, but their 
framing also mirrors how the U.S. prioritizes asylum-seekers. The U.S. generally has an 
asylum system that prioritizes individuals who are at the greatest risk in their home 
countries (although, as we know, this isn’t always what plays out). In a similar way, 
Northeast Legal Aid prioritizes clients based on these criteria. According to Meredith, 
one of their staff attorneys, as an organization “it is always focused on humanitarian legal 
rights and human rights.” I would not argue that this group chooses to be a humanitarian-
focused group because it would be easier to secure legitimacy and resources, but I would 
argue that their framing suggests that they try to remain squarely within the realm of what 
the U.S. views as legitimate cases for asylum.  
 Some other theories about the effects of the external resource environment also 
reign true in my study. The first is how groups must adapt to being “resource-poor,” i.e., 
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marginalized from centers of power and resources. This is the case for many immigrant-
led groups nationwide, given that many leaders and participants do not have access to 
running for public office nor to vote in elections. In general, many immigrants are denied 
access to power and resources due to their status as ‘outsiders,’ and they must adapt to 
this positioning to carry out effective organizing on their own behalf. A strong example 
of adapting to the denial of institutional power is the approach taken by La Comisión de 
la Huelga. The campaign that their organization rests on is focused on leveraging the 
economic power of immigrants—consumer power and their labor—to organize a 
nationwide strike of immigrant labor and provide an ultimatum to the public. La 
Comisión is using a type of power that immigrants certainly already have to adapt to 
being denied institutional and civic power. Their strategy is a direct result of their 
resource environment. Whereas they are denied certain forms of legitimacy, they garner 
legitimacy through different means.  
Overall, the groups in my study use frames that largely correspond to who they 
are trying to attract resources from. While more professionalized groups, such as LAIR of 
Northeast Legal Aid, might use frames that are made to appeal to government officials 
and large funders, other groups also use frames that correspond to their target adherent 
audiences. It seems that some groups are trying to convert bystanders into adherents, 
while others are specifically trying to appeal to conscience constituents, which are some 
of the resource mobilization tasks that McCarthy and Zald point to. Alcanzando las 
Estrellas mostly uses a frame that is meant to convert bystanders into adherents, that is, 
people who wouldn’t otherwise care about immigration rights but aren’t actively against 
 105 
them either. Their campaigns—such as their social media and outreach campaign where 
immigrants can share their personal story of how they make America strong—make sense 
given this goal. Other groups seem more focused on mobilizing conscience constituents. 
The Center for Education and Action—an immigrant-led SMO—puts a lot of effort into 
getting white allies to join their fight and leverage their privilege and power to demand 
that the U.S. changes their actions. In a very different vein, Partners for Just Borders, 
which is a group led mainly by non-immigrant allies, also focuses their efforts on 
engaging conscience constituents. Primarily through connecting with faith organizations, 
Partners hopes to ‘politicize’ its non-immigrant volunteers through their direct service 
and accompaniment programs that then lead volunteers to take action for systems-change. 
In addition, their financial resources almost entirely come from conscience constituents in 
faith communities with whom they try to build solidarity. With both of these groups, one 
can see how the groups cater their framing to appeal to whichever groups they’re trying 
to engage, which greatly connects to the resource mobilization hypothesis.   
Political and Cultural Opportunity 
 One of the questions posed by Bloemraad and Voss (2020) is whether political 
threats lead to repression or stronger mobilization for immigrant rights groups. In my 
data, it seems that repression has led to mobilization and action because of a greater 
availability of cultural capital. Many previously uninvolved people are politicized by the 
current administration, and beliefs about how immigration policy should look are much 
more central to the adherent pool of these organizations than they were before the current 
administration. The shift to an administration that’s much more hostile towards 
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immigrants’ rights has led to more action on the part of these organizations, which is 
evidenced by their growing support on social media, stronger resonance with adherents, 
and a greater number of overall demonstrations, rallies, and events since 2016. In 
addition, SMOs’ framing strategies have greatly taken to antagonizing Trump and 
rallying their bases around defeating him and what he represents. His name has become 
somewhat of a stand-in for anti-immigrant rhetoric and policy in general for many of 
these groups. The Workers’ Alliance for Immigration Rights actually shifted their focus 
from just labor issues to immigration upon Trump’s election because of the threat that he 
posed and the changing needs of their constituents. Partners for Just Borders was actually 
founded after the election of Trump in response to increased deportations of community 
members.  
Another example is Immigration Action Now, which started as an organization 
focused on increasing access to higher education for all immigrations. But upon the 
election of Trump, they shifted their framing entirely to begin to advocate for all issues 
that affect immigrants and focus more on multi-marginalized communities that Trump 
has been hostile towards. Other groups have changed their organizational structure and 
goals in response to political changes in the past. For example, the LAIR Coalition was 
founded in 1987 in response to the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 which 
allowed 3–5 million undocumented immigrants to become permanent residents in order 
to advocate for the “rights and integration of those immigrants.” However, in 1996, a 
welfare reform law that placed new restrictions on immigrants led them to grow by a 
dozen staff members and adjust their framing to fit with the new political reality.  
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Overall, I find that mobilization by my case study groups concentrates around 
significant political events. Rather than instilling fear and repressing action, it seems that 
these groups have trust that there will be enough support to carry out successful 
mobilization in response to political changes. Despite a simultaneously rising anti-
immigrant countermovement, these groups are adapting their frames to fit with the new 
political reality and the priorities of adherents and potential adherents.  
Age and Social Position 
 A variety of authors have theorized about how undocumented youth must 
navigate a unique social position as being raised in the United States but legally 
prohibited from residing here. Because of their unique realities, many undocumented 
youth-led groups have been challenging the status quo of the movement in feeling like 
their concerns are not being adequately represented. They have a strong sense of who 
should be telling the story, and it is not older, citizen advocates. Aligned with these 
observations, the two groups in my study that most vehemently reject the master frame 
that derives from the beginning of the movement are primarily youth and young adult-
led: Immigration Justice Now and Partners for Just Borders. The former is immigrant-led 
and the latter is not, which could suggest that this “new frame” has more to do with 
generational differences than one’s background as an immigrant. Both groups actively 
reject the exclusive claims made by other SMOs and call for solidarity among a variety of 
marginalized groups. They understand that other frames create notions of deservingness 
that inherently exclude certain groups of immigrants, and want to create a narrative in 
which they are fighting for liberation for all immigrants—whether they fit the 
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deservingness narrative or not. That this phenomenon is a result of generational 
differences is likely, given that it corresponds with larger cultural shifts in the use of 
inclusive language.  
 Despite having similar frames in terms of inclusivity, the two groups have vastly 
different prognostic frames. The immigrant-led group uses direct-action and community 
organizing to campaign for their concerns, while the ally-led group considers themselves 
“followers” of any organizing action that is put together by immigrants themselves. 
These roles fit in nicely with how Cabaniss (2019) describes how the undocumented-led 
movements she studied see how roles should be allocated: “They take a position that 
unambiguously cast DREAMers and their allies in different roles: DREAMers (should) 
lead; allies (should) follow” (493). It seems that, to some extent, younger allies are 
deciding to concede their power to make room for immigrant youth, who are painted as 
the proper leaders to speak up and organize.  
How far-reaching is class? 
Class-based claims were quite difficult to make in this study because I did not 
have clear data on the class backgrounds of leaders and participants. In trying to 
determine to what extent groups used materialist versus culturalist frames (Ginwright, 
2002; Rose, 1997), there was a mixed bag of groups that used each type of frame, and 
their usage did not fall along my perceived class-culture lines. The intersectional 
solidarity frame, for example, is a culturalist frame because it is interested in 
interrogating harmful norms and values. Although the groups that were more likely to 
adopt it do have higher education backgrounds, there are many groups with leaders with 
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higher education backgrounds who do not use a culturalist frame. As I mentioned, it is 
much more likely that this frame corresponds with generational differences and a larger 
cultural shift that’s occurring, rather than class-culture differences. 
 There is, however, some evidence of certain groups being more likely to use the 
individual biases frame—the frame that focuses on hate, prejudice, and discrimination as 
the roots of anti-immigrant sentiment in the U.S. —which was observed by Leondar-
Wright in her 2014 book as being more characteristic of working-class groups. 
Alcanzando las Estrellas, the Latinx Leadership Council, Immigration Services and 
Integration, and The Workers’ Alliance for Immigration Rights were the four groups 
most likely to use this frame. All four groups are led by individuals with bachelor’s or 
advanced degrees, thus contradicting the expectation that these groups would adopt this 
frame due to the class-culture of their leaders. However, these groups all employ a direct-
service model where they are consistently working with working-class folks in a capacity 
that not all other groups are. They are providing legal advice, citizenship classes, civic 
engagement classes, and more. The Workers’ Alliance is focused on the working class 
pretty much exclusively. This suggests that while the groups’ framing may not be 
impacted by the class of their founders, their frames might have something to do with the 
class background of the constituents with whom they constantly interact. Their 
constituents undoubtedly shape how these organizations advocate, given that their 
advocacy models all rest on advocating based on the needs of their client base.  
Leondar-Wright suggests that individuals with a higher education background 
would be more likely to adopt institutional frames that focus on systems and structures of 
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oppression. While there are certainly groups who employ such a frame, it does not seem 
to fall along the lines of which SMOs are led by leaders with a higher education 
background.  
Immigrant-Led Groups versus Ally-Led Groups 
One of the major factors that I was interested in exploring that does not seem to 
have a strong effect on SMO framing strategies is whether or not the leaders of the SMO 
are immigrants themselves. In this study, seven out of the eleven organizations that I 
studied are completely led by immigrants. Of the four groups that are “ally-led” (i.e., led 
by non-immigrants), one—the LAIR Coalition—has a staff that is about half immigrants 
and half non-immigrants, according to their website biographies. The other three SMOs 
(Northeast Legal Aid, Pathways Forward, and Partners for Just Borders) are primarily led 
by non-immigrants.  When looking at framing alone, my data did not suggest that this 
factor directly affected a group’s framing strategies. There were more similarities among 
SMOs’ framing processes when they were groups in terms of professionalization and 
resource dependency.  
However, it’s important to note that even if the immigration status of leaders does 
not directly impact how a group decides to frame the issue, it certainly can impact their 
legitimacy in the eyes of other organizations. As I’ve mentioned, Partners for Just 
Borders will only support community organizing that is led by immigrants themselves. 
Immigration Action Now makes it clear that they are asserting themselves as the rightful 
leaders of a movement that has for too long been dominated by voices that don’t value 
their particular concerns. In general, it seems that there is a stronger realization across the 
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board that immigrants themselves should be the ones leading the charge, and this is a sign 
of progress in the movement. There does not seem to be as much fear among immigrants 
who are at the forefront of organizing, as was the case in the early movement days. As I 
mentioned in the history of the movement section, many immigrants preferred to stay ‘in 
the shadows’ due to fear and stigma. This does not seem to be the case today, and many 
immigrant-led groups are making radical claims that challenge the way that the state 
operates.  
Another thing to note is that the resource mobilization tasks of an organization 
may be affected by one’s background as an immigrant, especially if one is 
undocumented. In an interview with Domenica, co-founder and programs director of 
Alcanzando las Estrellas, she talks about how at a young age, she realized that her 
capacity to make change in her community did not depend on “the system, did not 
depend on having a SSN, it did not depend on immigration status,” speaking to how 
undocumented people can have a strong voice in their communities no matter if the 
system is barring them from certain forms of action. La Comisión de la Huelga is a strong 
example of how immigrants must reckon with being denied certain arenas of power, but 
that they can adapt to this denial of resources by leveraging another kind of legitimacy: 
their labor and consumer power. While it is true that La Comisión de La Huelga is 
adopting this strategy because they are immigrant-led, it is not based on the sole fact of 
being immigrants, but on the resource mobilization challenge that they face because of 
their status as immigrants. Thus, the factor of resource dependency is a stronger factor to 
consider in what affects their framing strategies. However, it’s important to note that a 
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part of their framing has to do with being disappointed by legislators who promise to 
listen to them and protect them, but fail to do so year after year. In their own words, 
“They want our phone numbers for their elections but they never call us after they’re 
elected.” They express frustration at seeing immigration reform stall in Congress for over 
a decade, and are taking a new approach due to years of broken promises. This framing is 
the closest evidence of a group’s framing being explicitly affected by the immigration 
status of their leaders. They express a sense of urgency, a sense of being ‘used’ by 
politicians, and a sense of defeat that can only really be claimed by immigrants 
themselves who experience the repercussions of stalled immigration reform. Thus, while 
my data does not suggest a clear-cut, consistent way in which being immigrant-led or not 
affects SMO’s framing strategies, there is a certain legitimacy in the claims being made 
by immigrant-led groups that cannot exist in ally-led groups.  
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Conclusion 
 This paper explored the framing strategies of eleven different immigrant rights 
groups and analyzed a variety of reasons why they might arrive at the frames that they 
do. The purpose of this study was to gain a better understanding of how proponents of 
immigrants’ rights are interpreting the current political moment and get a sense of 
whether groups are on the same page about how America should be moving forward. 
This study aimed to assess the extent to which certain factors impact a social movement 
organization’s choice in framing. It also highlighted the tension between choosing frames 
that would appeal to a wider audience and potentially garner more resources versus 
choosing frames that represent the movement’s long-term, utopian ideals. 
 The factors I chose to explore are their external resource environment, the 
organization’s level of professionalization, and the background of the leaders in terms of 
class, status as an immigrant, and age. The data pointed strongly to the importance of a 
group’s external resource environment in determining how—and to whom—they frame 
the issue. Professionalized groups operating with more resources were more likely to 
employ frames that encouraged maintaining relationships with government institutions, 
pushed forward traditional notions of deservingness, and remained aligned with the 
U.S.’s current guidelines for accepting asylum-seekers. The political and cultural 
opportunity structure and existence of a previously salient ‘master frame’ seem to impact 
groups’ framing processes as well. There was strong evidence for generational 
differences in how the issues are framed, hinting at a future of the movement that 
embraces more inclusive, intersectional claims. The data did not suggest that leaders’ 
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background as an immigrant directly accounted for differences in framing strategies 
among SMOs, but leaders’ status as immigrants certainly impacts the resource 
environment from which they are able to draw.  
 What remains unclear is whether there is a long-term strategy employed by many 
of the groups. La Comisión de la Huelga—the group that is planning a large-scale, 
nationwide strike of immigrant labor and consumption—seems to have the strongest 
long-term strategy in place. But the majority of other immigrant rights groups are 
attending to the problems of ‘right now’: whether through putting major resources into 
direct service and legalization programs or through advocating for certain policies that 
provide minor relief. As I hinted throughout this paper, it will be worthwhile to keep our 
eyes on how immigrant rights organizations adapt to the potential change in national 
leadership in November of this year. Whether there is a new President who takes 
moderate steps towards changing the immigration landscape, or we remain with the anti-
immigrant leadership of Trump, groups will certainly have to adjust their framing 
processes to maintain their volunteer bases or fight against the anti-immigrant 
countermovement.  
  Future research would benefit by taking a wider look at the framing processes 
employed by the movement across the nation. Since different cities can face completely 
different immigration environments based on their local and state governments, it would 
be useful to explore whether certain frames are more common in certain localities than 
others and to theorize about how the political and social realities of that location might 
impact these outcomes. 
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 The findings presented in this paper point to a rising generation of young leaders 
who are not afraid to challenge harmful notions of deservingness that are present in the 
movement historically and currently. In addition, there seems to be a slow move towards 
more empowerment of immigrant-led groups and a tendency for groups that are not led 
by immigrants to step aside and make room for folks who are directly-impacted to voice 
their own concerns. The movement appears to be heading towards a future that centers 
more squarely on the voices of immigrants—and perhaps more undocumented 
immigrants—and employs framing that encourages broader solidarity across different 
social movements and causes.  
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